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INTRODUCTION
T HE current framework for securities regulation in the United
States emerged from the Great Depression of the 1930s. In re-
sponse to the financial excesses of the 1920s and the perceived pres-
ence of rampant fraud and manipulation in the capital markets,
Congress passed the Securities Act of 19331 (the "Securities Act") and
the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (the "Exchange Act") in rapid
succession.3 Together, the two Acts form the core of the modern-day
American securities regulation regime.4 Since the Great Depression,
this regime has grown and flourished under the guidance of the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Likewise, in several other
countries, similar regimes-some modeled explicitly on the American
system-have taken root.5 For several decades after the 1930s, these
regimes essentially operated independently of one another. Although
both companies and investors crossed national boundaries to raise or
invest capital in some limited circumstances, the majority of financial
activity took place within national borders. The advent of cheap and
widespread communication mechanisms among countries, as well as
the development of more reliable clearance and settlement systems to
conduct international transactions, radically transformed world capital
markets and has led to the integration of individual country markets.6
Today issuers regularly cross international boundaries to raise capital
across multiple countries.7 Similarly, investors may place their funds
in a multitude of investment opportunities around the globe.
The globalization of the world's securities markets has brought the
promise of more efficient markets and greater diversification of unsys-
tematic risks, to the benefit of both issuers and investors. Internation-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
3. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A His-
torical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 329, 329 (1988).
4. Other Acts which also form part of the United States securities regime in-
clude: the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of
1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. See Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fun-
damentals of Securities Regulation 35-46 (3d ed. 1995) (describing these Acts).
5. For example, the Japanese securities regime, at least in its framework, is pat-
terned after the United States's system. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in
Securities Markets: An Approach for Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclo-
sure Philosophies, 16 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 149, 149 (1993).
6. The world-wide movement towards market-based regimes as well as the
growth of international currency markets accelerated the trend towards globalization.
See, e.g., Andrew X. Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the
Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 62, 63
(1993) (describing the formation of China's securities markets).
7. Through American Depository Receipts, for example, hundreds of foreign
companies have gained access to the liquidity and capital of United States stock ex-
changes over the past decade. See Joseph Velli, American Depository Receipts: An
Overview, 17 Fordham Int'l L.J. S38, S46-50 (1994).
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alization, however, has also multiplied the challenges facing the
regulators of capital markets. In particular, globalization has in-
creased the burden on an individual country's regulators seeking to
maintain adequate disclosure, antifraud, and anti-manipulation rules
both within their own borders and abroad.8 For example, corporate
insiders who want to cash in on their informational advantage relative
to investors may seek to profit through trades in countries where in-
sider trading laws are nonexistent or rarely enforced. To the extent
that regulators seek to prevent insiders from profiting from their in-
formational advantage but are unable to monitor or regulate trades
taking place in foreign jurisdictions, the effect of insider trading
prohibitions is undermined.9 Furthermore, countries may compete
with one another to reduce the level of antifraud or mandatory disclo-
sure liability in order to attract issuers.10
This Article develops a framework to analyze the impact of global-
ization on country-specific securities regimes and to discuss possible
avenues to protect investors and maintain capital market integrity on
a global scale. This framework is then used to demonstrate that,
under certain simplified circumstances, the internationalization of
capital markets may lead to either a race-to-the-top or a race-to-the-
bottom in the quality of individual national securities regimes, de-
pending on how firms, investors, and managers behave. In this sense,
the dynamics of international regulatory competition resemble those
of state regulatory races-to-the-top and races-to-the-bottom in the
United States. There are, however, two important differences." First,
unlike the case of state competition, international competition takes
place without any oversight from a governing body able to regulate
for the entire market. While individual states may appeal to the fed-
eral government to step in where a race-to-the-bottom is evident, indi-
vidual countries have no similar centralized authority to turn to.
Although international treaties may serve as an alternative means to
engender cooperation among countries, such treaties are both time
8. Countries may seek to regulate transactions that take place abroad if those
transactions have an effect within that country. Under Regulation S, for example, the
United States may seek to impose the registration requirements of section 5 on for-
eign issuers selling securities to foreign nationals where selling efforts take place in
the United States. See Securities Act Rule 903(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b) (1996).
9. See Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Seeks Buyers of Duracell Options with Inside Knowl-
edge of Gillette Deal, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1996, at A2 (reporting that Swiss and
Bahaman financial institutions refused to identify possible insider traders to the
SEC).
10. See James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of Interna-
tional Regulatory Competition, 55 Law & Contemp. Probs. 157, 175 (Autumn 1992).
11. For a discussion of state regulatory competition, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Fed-
eralism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate
Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1444-46 (1992); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Share-
holder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 254-62
(1977).
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consuming to negotiate and difficult to enforce. Second, the degree of
difference among issuers, investors, and regulatory goals is greater in
the context of inter-country competition than state competition.
This Article argues that in a richer model of securities regulation-
one that accounts for differences among issuers, investors, and coun-
tries-the internationalization of securities markets provides an
unambiguously positive impact on the efficiency of securities markets.
This is so because the presence of heterogeneous issuers and investors
allows countries to compete to attract segments of the securities mar-
ket rather than seeking to appeal to the entire market. This, in turn,
implies that certain countries will adopt regulations that cater to par-
ticular types of securities, and that investors will be able to identify the
risk and quality of an issue at least in part by the country where the
issue takes place. For example, some countries may employ particu-
larly stringent securities disclosure and antifraud regimes, attracting
more truthful issuers. Investors, in turn, will price each issue based on
its associated country. Because differences are more pronounced be-
tween individual countries than between two states within the same
country, this richer model applies more to international regulatory
competition than to domestic races.
Given the more realistic context of a heterogeneous securities mar-
ket, this Article proceeds to consider a range of possible regulatory
strategies that could be adopted to deal with international capital mar-
kets, including the dominant approaches taken in the United States.
It offers a series of recommendations, calling for a return to a more
territorial jurisdictional limit on American securities laws and for the
support of international capital mobility. This Article also argues for
a recognition of the principle that Americans who go abroad to invest
in foreign securities markets should be considered to have accepted
the risks and returns that exist in those markets. In addition, this Arti-
cle suggests that the rise in importance of institutional investors and
market-driven, third-party gatekeepers provides additional assurances
that a territorial regime is optimal from both a global point of view
and from the point of view of American investors and firms.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a framework to
analyze the impact of globalization on national securities regimes and
then analyzes the implications of the framework for global securities
markets. Part II discusses the responses to globalization that currently
exist and are used in the United States, including an assessment of the
advantages and disadvantages of each. It also offers recommenda-
tions regarding how national laws should respond to the challenge
posed by international investment. Further discussion of how national
regimes can encourage the development of welfare increasing out-
comes is included in part III, which also defends the recommendations
of this Article against the charge that capital markets are not sophisti-
cated enough to benefit from these proposals.
[Vol. 651858
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I. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Over the past fifteen years, world capital markets have undergone
rapid and dramatic change. Driven by the rise in information technol-
ogy and relative political and economic stability across several differ-
ent nations, capital markets-from Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan
to the United States, Switzerland, and Great Britain-have become
largely interconnected. Traders on the London Stock Exchange, for
example, monitor bid-ask prices on the New York Stock Exchange
and other markets when determining their own market clearing
prices. Today, companies regularly go abroad either to seek new fi-
nancing or to develop a liquid market for their existing securities. By
1993, almost 1000 foreign companies had listed securities in the form
of American Depository Receipts within the United States.' 2 Inves-
tors, similarly, often place their funds abroad either directly through
the purchase of foreign securities in foreign markets or indirectly
through a domestic institutional investor intermediary specializing in
overseas investments.
Despite the widespread and well-recognized growth in international
securities activity, the academic community is only beginning to ana-
lyze this phenomenon. In order to further the understanding of the
impact of the growing integration of capital markets on securities reg-
ulatory regimes, this part develops a simple theoretical foundation
with which to analyze the pressures facing individual countries and
their regulatory regimes. The framework will be used to examine the
impact internationalization has on regulation and policy decisions.
Although the framework makes some important assumptions that will
be relaxed later in the Article, an understanding of this simplified
model of international securities markets will be helpful to follow the
more realistic discussions later in the Article.
A. The Conceptual Framework
First consider the major parties to a securities offering transaction:
investors, issuers, and the countries within which the transaction takes
place. Investors seek to maximize the return on their investment, ad-
justed for the amount of systematic risk involved. 3 The key problem
plaguing capital markets is one of asymmetric information between
issuers and investors. In a world Without any regulatory protections,
investors bear the risk that the securities they purchase may be worth
less than the securities' represented value. The buyer-who has the
greatest incentive to evaluate correctly the value of the security-
often possesses only limited information regarding the firm issuing the
12. See Velli, supra note 7, at S46.
13. See Thomas E. Copeland & J. Fred Weston, Financial Theory and Corporate
Policy 193-217 (2d ed. 1983) (deriving and discussing the capital asset pricing model of
securities pricing).
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securities. Insiders and the firm itself are more likely to have accurate
information about the state of the firm and the fair value of the securi-
ties. Insiders and the issuer, however, have only a limited incentive to
disclose this information and, indeed, often have an incentive to re-
lease misleading information in order to raise the price of the securi-
ties artificially. Issuers, for example, may use this advantage to issue
overvalued securities for the benefit of their current shareholders.
Rational investors, of course, realize the incentive of insiders and issu-
ers to engage in such practices and discount the value of securities
accordingly. This result may actually cause some issuers to release
corporate information voluntarily. 14 For several reasons, however, is-
suers may nevertheless fail to release all information truthfully. For
example, managers interested in insider trading may delay the release
of information or even actively misstate the true value of their com-
pany's securities.' 5
Keeping in mind the asymmetry of information between investors
and issuers, consider the pool of all firms that represent to the public
that the value of their issue is equal to a certain amount. Investors,
using publicly available information, may be able to distinguish the
quality of issues only between gross subsets of these firms. Within any
one particular subset investors may lack the ability to separate rela-
tively high- and low-value companies. Without any form of
mandatory disclosure or an antifraud regime, investors seeking to
maximize their return will price all firms within any one subset the
same, leading high-value firms to subsidize low-value firms.'6 More
stringent securities regulations which work to reduce the asymmetric
information problem would reduce the size of these subsets as inves-
tors become better informed. This will decrease the amount higher-
value firms subsidize lower-value firms, leading to a more efficient al-
location of capital.
Issuers, in turn, seek to maximize the proceeds from any particular
offering of securities. At any given issue price, issuers will prefer less
regulation. Greater regulation in the form of more stringent antifraud
or mandatory disclosure rules may result in higher costs associated
with putting forth an offering or may increase the likelihood of frivo-
14. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669, 675 (1984). But see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L.
Rev. 717, 722-23 (1984) (arguing for the necessity of a mandatory disclosure system).
15. Additionally, because information is a public good, corporations acting pri-
vately may under-provide this information. See Coffee, supra note 14, at 722.
16. For example, consider the situation where a high-value firm is worth $20 per
share but a low-value firm is worth only $10 per share. Where investors are unable to
distinguish between the two types of firms, investors will pay $15 per share for the
shares of each firm. This, in turn, may lead high-value firms to either seek out means
of credibly distinguishing themselves from low-value firms or to simply exit the
market.
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lous suits resulting from the offering.'7 Of course, stricter regulation
may increase the willingness of investors to pay more for any particu-
lar issue, and issuers as a group may desire higher regulation as a re-
sult. Holding the issue price constant, however, increased regulation
will discourage some issuers from entering the market and will, there-
fore, reduce the supply of new issues.
Finally, key to the framework is the notion that individual countries
will compete to maintain or expand their respective financial centers.
Singapore, for example, gains as both foreign issuers and investors
seek to float and trade securities within Singapore's borders. In-
creased volume provides domestic residents with greater liquidity and
domestic companies with reduced transaction costs in raising capital.
Furthermore, increased volume provides a country with greater tax
revenue and gives domestic regulators more responsibility and pres-
tige. The country may also enjoy spillover benefits to the economy as
a whole in the form of increased job formation as issuers choose to
establish factories and operations where they raise capital; greater in-
ternational trade spurred through greater stability and liquidity in the
financial sector may also result. Although countries may certainly
pursue other objectives, many will either pursue volume as their pri-
mary goal or else find that volume maximization is a necessary precur-
sor to whatever other goal they choose to pursue. For example, a
country may seek to use its securities market as a means to raise reve-
nue-perhaps by imposing a tax on every transaction. The country
must also, however, take into account the impact of such a policy on
overall volume; excessive taxation will reduce revenue through its
negative impact on volume. Similarly, countries interested in investor
protection will also benefit from increased securities volume: more
volume leads to greater economies of scale for regulatory authorities
as well as more attention from sophisticated investors and interna-
tional financial intermediaries. These, in turn, lead to greater effi-
ciency in the market to the benefit of all investors. As this Article also
discusses, the ability of countries to pursue objectives other than se-
curities volume maximization becomes limited as capital mobility
increases.
A simple representation of an individual country's securities market
is provided in Figure 1. The x-axis in Figure 1 corresponds to the vol-
ume (q) of securities transactions within the country. The y-axis, con-
versely, represents 1-r where r is the discount rate relative to the
represented "value" of the securities. The represented value is de-
fined here as the issuer's own publicly stated expected present value
of future payments to investors. Investors discount this stated value,
taking into account the risk of business failure and the risk of fraud.
17. Cf. James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 903 (1996) (providing evi-
dence on the presence of frivolous securities fraud class action suits).
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Where the economy has a high incidence of fraud, investors will dis-
count the represented value at a greater rate. For example, an issuer
may state that investors will receive $100 cash payment next year for
purchasing their security this year; where investors take as their dis-
count rate r = 0.1, then investors will pay only $90 for the security
today. To focus on the effects of fraud, the remainder of the Article
assumes that the discount r takes into account only the risk of fraud.
In other words, the time value of money is taken to be zero and it is
assumed that there are no other systematic risks.
P n
1-r*=p*
'D
q*
FIGURE 1
Within the framework of Figure 1, there are two separate dynamic
considerations. First, the supply of securities in the market depends
negatively on the discount rate. For example, a range of issuers with
investment projects of different value may exist. Some issuers may
have relatively low-return projects; others may have relatively high
return projects. The greater the discount rate, the lower the amount
of proceeds that any one issuer may obtain from an offering. There-
fore, at high discount rates, only those issuers with relatively high-
return projects will seek to issue securities. Only these issuers are able
to realize enough return from their investment projects to justify ob-
taining capital with such a high discount factor. Conversely, as the
discount rate drops, more issuers are able to obtain capital to fund
their investment projects profitably. This relationship is represented
by the supply curve, S, in Figure 1. To the extent additional regula-
tions placed on issuers raise their costs, to achieve the same level of
return issuers must receive a correspondingly lower discount rate.
More regulations therefore shift the supply curve upward. In other
words, all other things being equal, additional regulations cause fewer
firms to supply securities at any given discount rate.
Second, the volume of securities investors will demand depends on
the discount rate. Investors always face the choice of consuming their
funds or investing them for greater future consumption. To the extent
[Vol. 651862
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that a range of different preferences exist among investors with re-
spect to future consumption, the amount of investment funds avail-
able will vary with the discount rate. As the discount rate decreases,
fewer investors will choose to participate in the capital market. Con-
versely, higher discount rates-corresponding to a higher rate of re-
turn for investors-will result in a greater demand by investors for
investment projects."8 The dynamics of investor demand are repre-
sented by the demand curve, D, in Figure 1. Investors will adjust for
the possibility of fraud by demanding a higher discount rate. All other
things being equal, therefore, the greater the probability of fraud, the
lower the securities demand at any given discount rate. To the extent
more stringent regulations reduce the risk of fraud, therefore, the de-
mand curve will shift upwards.
Equilibrium occurs in the domestic framework where the securities
supply and demand lines meet. In other words, equilibrium is
achieved when the market supply of securities issues equals the mar-
ket demand for such issues. Where supply does not equal demand,
market forces will cause the discount rate to adjust until the two be-
come equal. For example, where the supply of securities is greater
than the demand for securities, securities issuers will be induced to
increase the discount rate for their securities, raising r until the market
clears and all issuers are able to find investors willing to purchase their
securities at the market clearing discount factor-at point (1-r*, q*) in
Figure 1. The sensitivity of investment demand and securities sup-
ply-in other words, the demand and supply elasticity-will deter-
mine the amount r must adjust before the market clears. Where the
supply of securities is completely elastic at r*-for example, because
capital is mobile and issuers are able to obtain r* in other countries-
then the market will always clear at r*.
Given this framework, the "first best" or social optimum occurs
when investment projects are financed if and only if they have a posi-
tive net expected value. Because transfers between investors and issu-
ers result in no net social loss or gain, social welfare depends solely on
the number and quality of investment projects undertaken. Note that
an increase in the number of securities offering transactions is not nec-
essarily indicative of increased social welfare; some of the additional
volume, for example, could represent negative expected value projects
issued fraudulently to the public. The first best, therefore, corre-
sponds to the volume of transactions which would occur in the ab-
sence of asymmetric information and fraud. If all parties to a
transaction were fully informed, demand would be perfectly elastic at
18. The curves representing the demand (D) and supply (S) of securities will also
depend on a variety of other factors that are not explicitly represented in the figure.
When these factors (i.e., the overall economic climate) change, the curves will shift
accordingly.
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1-r=1."9 Therefore, within this framework, the theoretical first best
occurs at the point (1, qf), which corresponds to a discount rate of zero
and the corresponding volume, denoted qf. Point (1, qf) is displayed
below in Figure 2.
S
D
qf
FIGURE 2
In a world of asymmetric information, however, the first best is un-
obtainable. Given a particular set of demand and supply curves
driven by both domestic factors and international capital mobility,
however, regulators may affect the positioning of the securities supply
and demand lines within the framework in an effort to achieve the
"regulatory ideal." We define the regulatory ideal as the level of regu-
lation that issuers and investors within any one country would choose
if they could contract freely and without cost. 0 We denote the regula-
tory ideal as point (1-r', q'). Note that this level of regulation is
"ideal" only in the sense that it is preferred by parties within a coun-
try. This regulatory ideal, although desirable from the perspective of
an individual country-may not represent a good outcome in terms of
global welfare, as will be discussed in section B.2.
Regulations that diminish the risk of fraud borne by investors by
more than the corresponding increase in cost to issuers represent a net
gain to the parties to the transaction. An increase in regulatory con-
trols, for instance, will cause the supply line to shift upward because it
will impose an additional cost of compliance on issuers, implying that
at any given discount rate issuers will offer fewer securities. Also,
tightened regulations will shift the demand curve upward because
more regulation will reduce the amount of asymmetric information,
19. In the context of full information, issuers would gain nothing by representing
their issues in a misleading fashion, because the investors already know the true value
of the issue.
20. We label this level the "regulatory ideal" because it is the preferred regulatory
situation from the point of view of all three parties to the transaction: the firm, the
investor, and the government.
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leading investors to demand more securities at a given discount rate.
Where parties experience a net gain, as Figure 3 shows, the shift in the
demand curve will be larger in magnitude than the corresponding shift
in the supply curve, leading to an increase in the volume of securities
sold-to the point (1-r2, q2) in Figure 3.
1-r2 - - - -
' ' -D
I I
I I
1 2q' q
FIGuIx 3
Conversely, if an increase in regulations diminishes the risk of fraud
by less than the increased compliance cost to the issuer, the supply
curve will shift more than the demand curve and the volume of trans-
actions will decrease. Therefore, to the extent issuers and investors
make capital decisions based on their own best interests, the joint wel-
fare of issuers and investors is optimized where regulations maximize
the volume of transactions. The regulatory ideal, (1-r, q'), as a result,
is the point that maximizes the joint welfare of issuers and investors
and maximizes an individual country's securities volume. As dis-
cussed in section B.2, where principal-agent problems lead issuers and
investors to make capital decisions not in their respective best inter-
ests, however, countries seeking to maximize their securities volume
may adopt an individual country regulatory ideal that does not maxi-
mize global welfare.
B. Implications of the Framework
Despite the simplicity of the framework presented in the previous
section, it allows us to analyze a range of questions that pertain to
both domestic and international securities markets. In this section, we
consider how internationalization affects the behavior of policymakers
and the normative implications of these effects in terms of global
welfare.
1865
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1. Mobility & Internationalization
We start with a simple question: How does the internationalization
of capital markets affect domestic policy decisions when all countries
share similar priorities and goals? In other words, we abstract initially
from the many substantive differences among nations and consider
only the impact internationalization has on the policy decisions of
countries in a world made up of identical parties. As this section dem-
onstrates, internationalization itself, even if countries are not substan-
tively different, can nevertheless affect the policy decisions of those
countries. The assumption that countries are identical is then relaxed,
and the more complex question of internationalization among hetero-
geneous countries is examined.
Consider a closed country where neither investors nor issuers have
the opportunity to shift their activities abroad. Because even in a
closed economy, both potential investors and potential issuers have
alternatives to the securities market, they will react to changes in the
discount level of securities (by moving along the demand and supply
curves, respectively) or in the regulatory regime (through a shift in the
curves). Because the market is purely domestic, however, individuals
can only avoid domestic regulations by investing their funds in a non-
securities vehicle or through consumption. In a strictly domestic envi-
ronment, therefore, the country has considerable flexibility in its
choice of regulatory system. There is no other available securities
market, so both issuers and investors must accept the chosen system.
Although some choices may be more efficient than others, the lack of
alternatives ensures that both the supply of and demand for securities
will be relatively insensitive to the choice of regulatory regime,21 im-
plying that regulatory choices will have only a modest effect on the
volume of transactions.' Individual countries, therefore, can choose
to pursue various domestic goals through their regulatory regimes,
even if these goals undermine the efficiency of the securities market.2 3
Now, imagine that the country opens its securities market to inter-
act with the market in another, identical country. In order to make
21. This is relative to the open economy case.
22. This assumes that the domestic non-securities alternatives are neither too nu-
merous nor attractive.
23. For example, in the domestic context, after a securities regulatory regime is
instituted, whether the regime actually achieves the socially optimal level of regula-
tion depends on the makeup of the regulatory agency and the regulated bodies. Bu-
reaucrats within an agency, for example, may have an incentive to expand their power
and influence through the promulgation of numerous and complex rules requiring
constant agency monitoring. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsoles-
cence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L.
Rev. 909, 913-16 (1994). Bureaucrats may also seek to enhance their job prospects by
catering to the interests of issuers or investment professionals. Agencies, finally, may
make mistakes in their regulatory designs which take time and experience to uncover
and correct. To the extent this occurs, individual countries may impose levels of regu-
lation that are too high.
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the analysis as simple as possible, we will assume that capital move-
ment between the two countries is costless. Prior to the opening of
the markets, both countries, by assumption, face identical demand and
supply curves, have adopted identical securities regulation and are, in
all other relevant respects, identical. 4
An initial observation is that the opening of the markets will not
generate any cross-border activity. After the markets are opened,
cross-border transactions are permitted, but because the demand and
supply conditions are identical in the two countries, there is no incen-
tive for any party actually to undertake an international investment or
offering. The fact that the two countries are identical implies that the
discount rate and the regulatory regime are the same in both coun-
tries, and there is nothing to be gained by going abroad.
Despite the lack of transnational activity, however, the opening of
the capital markets will affect the decisions of policymakers. When
the markets are opened, the new, integrated market features twice the
demand and twice the supply of each of the individual closed markets.
Any policy change in one country has the potential to initiate transna-
tional activity through a shift in investments across countries.25 Sup-
pose, for example, that one country were to increase its disclosure
requirements. This would both increase costs for issuers and reduce
the asymmetry of information, shifting both the demand and supply
curves upward, as discussed in the framework above.26 The important
point for the present discussion is that the impact of the policy change
on the volume of transactions will be greater when markets are inte-
grated than when they remain closed.
To see why this is so, assume for the moment that the domestic
market starts at its regulatory ideal point (1-?', q'). Now consider an
increase in regulatory disclosure requirements that moves the market
away from the regulatory ideal. If the market is closed, some issuers
will simply choose to eschew the securities market altogether as this is
the only way for parties to avoid the new regulations in a closed mar-
ket. Specifically, issuers will choose not to participate in the securities
market when they possess an alternative that offers a higher return
than the new securities regime. Conversely, issuers for whom the se-
curities market still represents the best investment option will con-
tinue to participate in the market.
Now consider the exact same increase in regulatory requirements if
the market is integrated with a foreign capital market. Because we
have moved from the regulatory ideal to some other regime, we know
24. By assuming that the two countries are identical, we are able to abstract away
the effect that different regimes can have on one another and isolate the impact of
internationalization.
25. In other words, the demand and supply curves of each country become more
sensitive to changes in the discount level. Both curves are more elastic.
26. See supra part I.A.
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that participants in the market prefer the old regime to the new one.
We also know that the old regime is still available; specifically, it can
be found in the foreign country. Because we have assumed that trans-
national movement is costless, all investors and issuers will choose the
foreign regime-that is, they will choose to carry out their transac-
tions in the foreign country-rather than the new domestic one.
The opening of the market, therefore, makes both the demand
curve and the supply curve flatter-i.e., more elastic. Ultimately, if
markets are perfectly integrated, both the demand and supply of se-
curities are infinitely sensitive to changes in the discount level. No
policy change can be made without reducing the volume of transac-
tions to zero in one of the two countries. If the change represents a
shift away from the regulatory ideal, all transactions will move to the
other country. On the other hand, if the change shifts the regulations
closer to the regulatory ideal, it will induce all foreign transactions to
move to the domestic market. Because internationalization makes the
impact of policy changes greater than they would be in a closed econ-
omy, it also increases the pressure on countries to adopt the regula-
tory ideal level of regulation. The internationalization of capital
markets implies that failure to adopt the regulatory ideal will lead to a
greater loss in securities volume.
Furthermore, the more countries from which investors can choose,
the more likely it is that a policy change will drive a particular local
transaction abroad or attract a foreign one. As greater numbers of
countries are added, more potential transacting parties exist in foreign
markets that may be attracted to a particular country following a
change toward the regulatory ideal. Consider, for example, the two-
country case in which country 1 places no restrictions on the mobility
of its investors and issuers but country 2 remains closed. Although
investors and issuers from country 1 are mobile, they are unable to
shift their investment activities to any alternative, and country 1,
therefore, acts as a completely immobile regime. Next, imagine that
both countries 1 and 2 allow mobility. In this case, the regulatory de-
cisions of country 1 will impact the decisions of country 2 as discussed
above. To the extent different countries may change their regulatory
regimes at different speeds, possess different incentives with respect to
the maximization of trading volume within the country's borders, or
learn from one another's regulatory efforts, the benefit to one country
of providing issuer and investor mobility, rises as other countries pro-
vide for capital mobility.
This analysis is important to policymakers because the conclusion
that policy changes evoke a greater market response in more inte-
grated economies is equivalent to concluding that policymakers have
less flexibility in choosing policy. More integrated economies will
make it much more costly for a policymaker to adopt a regime that
deviates from the regulatory ideal. A change in regulation that is
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viewed as undesirable by issuers and/or investors might lead to only a
small reduction in the amount of activity on a domestic securities mar-
ket. The same change when markets are international, however, may
lead to a large drop in activity. For example, parties may simply
choose to conduct their business abroad. This suggests that countries
will race to adopt the regulatory ideal and that policymakers will have
less flexibility to adopt other regimes to achieve goals other than the
maximization of the volume within their borders? 7
To the extent increased internationalization results in increased mo-
bility, the pressure on countries to adopt or at least to move toward
the regulatory ideal is therefore increased. The next section considers
whether the regulatory ideal is likely to foster globally optimal
policies.
2. Race-to-the-Top and Race-to-the-Bottom
The discussion of the regulatory framework in part I.A identified
what was referred to as the regulatory ideal level of regulation. This
regulatory ideal refers to the preferred regulatory regime from the
point of view of an individual country. This section examines the
broader question of whether this country-specific regulatory ideal is
likely to be efficient from a global perspective?28
Within the framework provided in part I.A, under conditions al-
lowing fully mobile investors and issuers, countries acting in their own
self-interest will adopt a common set of regulatory standards.2 9 The
common set of standards comes about through competition among
countries to offer the most hospitable environment to securities trans-
actions. To the extent that individual countries seek to maximize the
volume of transactions, they will set the level of regulation to satisfy
both investors and companies; otherwise, the parties may choose to
flee to another country.
The first question to be addressed is whether these standards are
desirable from an international perspective. Two polar possibilities
exist. Countries may compete with one another in order to establish
the most efficient regulatory regime, leading to a race-to-the-top. Al-
ternatively, they may engage in a harmful form of competition, result-
27. See Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateral-
ism and Functionalism. A Comparison with Reference to Securities Regulation, 4
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 69, 82-85 (1994) (discussing reasons why countries
may differ in their securities regulatory goals).
28. Debate exists over the optimal level of regulation in a purely domestic situa-
tion. See, eg., Coffee, supra note 14, at 722-23; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14,
at 672-73. In order to focus on the international issues, we will abstract from the
domestic issues and assume that there is some agreement as to what constitutes the
efficient level of regulation at the global level. We will then ask if that is the amount
of regulation that is likely to occur.
29. Part I.C. discusses whether all countries will move to a common regulatory
regime or whether they will adopt different regimes.
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ing in inefficient regimes and leading to a race-to-the-bottom. On the
domestic front, there is debate regarding whether the United States
corporate law system promotes a race-to-the-top or a race-to-the-bot-
tom. 30 In the international context, the issues are similar, so only a
brief presentation of the main arguments is provided. The section
then argues, however, that the dichotomy between a race-to-the-top
and a race-to-the-bottom is too simplistic in the international arena,
and more realistic assumptions lead to the conclusion that a desirable
diversity of regimes may result.
a. Race-to-the-Top
The argument that regulatory competition will lead to a race-to-the-
top is straightforward. A securities transaction is ultimately a contract
between the buyer and seller of a security. It is well established that,
in the absence of transaction costs, buyers and sellers will select the
most efficient terms for a contract.31 Similarly, if the parties to a se-
curities transaction can choose among regimes, they will seek the most
efficient jurisdiction-the one that offers the level of regulation that
maximizes the total value of the transaction, including compliance
costs. Jurisdictions that demand too much regulation will be avoided
because the cost of compliance is not worth the additional information
made available; jurisdictions that have too little regulation will be
avoided because the risk-bearing cost borne by the buyer exceeds the
savings enjoyed by the seller. Countries competing to attract securi-
ties transactions, therefore, will strive toward the most efficient regu-
latory regime, leading to a race-to-the-top.
The race-to-the-top argument can be illustrated by using the frame-
work established in part I.A. Assume that a particular country begins
at the regulatory ideal point (1-r', qi) which maximizes the welfare of
investors and issuers as a group. Assume further that managers seek
to maximize the value of their firms.32 Now suppose that the country
considers imposing a different regulatory regime. Because we are
moving away from the regulatory ideal-implying that the cost to issu-
ers as a result of the regulatory change is greater than the correspond-
ing gain to investors-the supply curve will shift more than the
demand curve, as reflected by the curves S' and D' in Figure 4. The
resulting equilibrium features a lower volume of sales and a higher
discount level, given by (1-r', q') in Figure 4.
Now consider a reduction in the level of regulations. Because we
are reducing the regulations below the ideal level, the cost of such a
30. In the context of state corporate law, several commentators have debated
whether a race-to-the-bottom or a race-to-the-top exists. See generally Bebchuk, supra
note 11, at 1444-46 (noting shortcomings of both theories).
31. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Con-
tract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416 (1989) (discussing the contractual basis of corporations).
32. This assumption will be relaxed in part I.B.2.b.
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FIGURE 4
change to the investor is greater than the benefits to the issuer.
Therefore, the demand curve will shift downward by a larger amount
than the supply curve, as shown in Figure 5. The result is an equilib-
rium at (1-r', q') in Figure 5 where both the discount level and sales
volume are reduced.
1-r' ,s
I I
FIGURE 5
In this case, therefore, countries acting individually, and seeking to
maximize the volume of securities transactions within their borders,
will move toward the regulatory ideal. Furthermore, shareholders of
issuers and investors would contract for this level of regulation if they
could do so at no cost. Implicitly, therefore, it is the most efficient
possible regime from a global perspective. It will come closest to
achieving the global optimum of funding projects only if they have a
positive net present value.
Moreover, the pressure on countries to race-to-the-top depends on
the slope-or sensitivity-of the supply and demand curves. The
more sensitive investors are to changes in price-i.e., the flatter the
demand curve-the greater the drop in securities volume countries
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will experience as they move away from the ideal regulatory regime.3
Similarly, a flatter supply curve, implying that the supply is more sen-
sitive to changes in the discount factor, will result in countries exper-
iencing larger gains in securities volume as they move toward the ideal
regime. In the extreme, where supply and demand are completely
elastic, countries will face the greatest pressure to engage in a race-to-
the-top. Because greater global capital mobility of issuers or investors
necessarily increases the sensitivity of any one country's securities
supply or demand curves, such mobility therefore raises the pressure
on individual countries to race-to-the-top.
b. Race-to-the-Bottom
A race-to-the-top, however, is not the only possible outcome.
Races-to-the-bottom may be driven by mobile issuers, mobile inves-
tors, or both.
Mobile issuers may provoke a race-to-the-bottom because, although
the firm issues the securities, the firm's managers actually choose
where the issue will take place. 4 Managers, therefore, may engage in
opportunistic behavior to increase their own welfare at the expense of
the issuer. For example, although disclosing more information may
increase the value of the company to shareholders, managers may pre-
fer not to disclose this information in order to enhance their ability to
engage in conduct such as insider trading. Similarly, managers may
desire to withhold or manipulate information to boost their compen-
sation or dampen the impact of negative performance on their job
prospects. 35 As a result, managers may prefer to issue securities in
countries where the securities regime allows them to engage in such
opportunistic behavior. Although this behavior reduces net offering
proceeds, managers may gain enough to outweigh the indirect loss
they suffer from the decline in proceeds.36
Because managers choose where to issue securities, a country that
wishes to maximize volume will do so by offering the set of regulations
that would be negotiated by investors and managers. In other words,
in a world in which managers' interests diverge from the interests of
shareholders, the regulatory ideal will maximize the total value cap-
tured by investors and managers rather than investors and
shareholders.
33. See supra part I.B.1.
34. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 10, at 164-73 (describing how managerial opportu-
nism may result in countries rushing to reduce their insider trading laws and dilute the
breadth and depth of their disclosure regulations in order to attract such managers).
35. See it; Coffee, supra note 14, at 738-43.
36. The race-to-the-bottom is constrained by the limits to managerial opportu-
nism. These include: (i) corporate law, (ii) corporate structure and compensation
schemes, and (iii) inertia, i.e., there is pressure to issue in the market one is already in.
This may explain why corporations are not as mobile in some countries. Nevertheless,
at the margin, we expect opportunism to play a role.
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The pressure on countries to race-to-the-bottom in the face of man-
agerial opportunism depends on the price sensitivity of both supply
and demand. The more mobile investors and issuers are, the greater
the pressure to race-to-the-bottom, at least where all firms engage in
managerial opportunism. Suppose that all countries are identical
and that each is at some point other than the regulatory ideal. A
country considering deviating towards the regulatory ideal in order to
attract issuers driven by managerial incentives will gain more volume
if demand and supply are very price-sensitive. If demand is sensitive,
a small deviation toward or away from the regulatory ideal would lead
to a large change in the number of investors willing to participate in
the market for securities at any given discount factor. Similarly, price
sensitive supply implies that a small deviation from the regulatory
ideal will cause the supply of securities in the national market to
change dramatically. This result implies that an increase in the mobil-
ity of investors or issuers-i.e., an increase in sensitivity-will make
the gains from moving towards the regulatory ideal much greater for
an individual country. If the regulatory ideal is undesirable from a
global perspective due to the private interests of managers, the race-
to-the-bottom is exacerbated by increases in capital mobility. 8
Where investors are mobile, another possible reason exists for a
race-to-the-bottom. To the extent investors invest money through fi-
nancial intermediaries, a principal-agent problem may exist between
the investors and their fund managers. Fund managers, for example,
may prefer countries with relatively lax disclosure and insider trading
laws that enable the fund managers to profit from trades for their own
personal accounts using information gathered for the benefit of the
fund's investors. As with the race-to-the-bottom in the case of mobile
issuers, some countries may seek to tailor their securities laws to at-
tract such fund managers. Suppose all countries again start with the
globally optimal regime. To the extent that a country can increase its
trading volume by tailoring its regime to attract opportunistic fund
managers, all countries may engage in such a race.
37. Note that this observation is not, by itself, sufficient reason to discourage capi-
tal mobility. Benefits of capital mobility extend far beyond the area of securities reg-
ulation and include the efficient pricing of investment opportunities, increased
liquidity in foreign exchange markets, and increased opportunities for foreign direct
investment. The related benefits include technology sharing, more efficient produc-
tion, and gains from trade.
38. Of course, a race-to-the-bottom may not occur to the extent the original share-
holders of the company realize the incentive of managers to act opportunistically and
either impose controls on such managers or else seek managers with non-opportunis-
tic reputations. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fschel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation
of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119, 127-32 (1987). Because inves-
tors are unable to determine whether managers' selections of another jurisdiction are
due to opportunism or another advantage of the jurisdiction-i.e., lower issuing
costs-investors may not be able to control such opportunism er ante.
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As with mobile issuers, the magnitude of the investor-led race-to-
the-bottom depends on the price-sensitivity of supply. More mobile
issuers exacerbate the race-to-the-bottom where all investors and
countries are homogeneous. Intuitively, a greater supply of issuers
magnifies the gain to any one country from attracting more investors
through regulations catering to the opportunistic desires of fund
managers.
c. Race-to-the-Regulatory Ideal
Both of the above "races" are driven by a single national motiva-
tion. In each case, national regulatory authorities want to adopt regu-
lations that will maximize the volume of transactions within their
jurisdiction. To do so, the national authorities gravitate toward the
regulatory ideal in an effort to attract the decision makers in a transac-
tion. In a race-to-the-top case, the shareholders and investors are the
decision makers, and the regulatory ideal is optimal to them, implying
that it is the most efficient regime. On the other hand, in a race-to-
the-bottom situation, managers of issuers and managers of financial
intermediaries are the decision makers. Because the interests of these
managers generally will not correspond to the interest of shareholders
and investors, efforts by the policymakers to appeal to the interests of
managers will not be welfare maximizing from a global perspective.
Although countries will adopt regulations to maximize their own wel-
fare by maximizing the volume of transactions in their jurisdiction, the
overall effect is a race-to-the-bottom.
In both cases, however, it is useful to notice that countries "race" to
the regulatory ideal in an effort to attract the decision makers in a
transaction. Furthermore, global capital mobility increases the
"speed" of the race by increasing pressure on governments to adopt
the regulatory ideal. Only by knowing how the decision makers for
managers and institutional funds behave, however, can we know if the
race is to the top or the bottom.
C. Heterogeneous Parties and Countries
The analysis thus far has assumed that issuers, investors, and coun-
tries are identical in their preferences. Without more, the analysis in
the international context follows that of the domestic state regulation
race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom literature.39 The assumptions
behind the race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom paradigms, how-
ever, are too simplistic for the international context. This section ex-
pands the analysis to include differences among issuers and investors
as well as variations among countries and the domestic size of their
securities markets. In particular, this section discusses the possibility
that differences among heterogeneous parties will lead to diversity
39. See supra note 30.
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among national regulatory regimes. Not only is it possible that a spec-
trum of securities regimes would develop, but such an outcome would
be welfare improving. Finally, this section discusses several factors
that determine the likelihood of this desirable outcome.
We relax the assumption of homogeneity among issuers and inves-
tors in an effort to make the framework more realistic. Differences
may exist among issuers, investors, and national securities markets for
many reasons. Issuers, for instance, differ in the cost they bear to
comply with a particular securities regime. For most companies, in-
creased mandatory disclosure entails greater legal fees and investiga-
tive due diligence costs. Other companies, however, bear not only
these costs but also the added burden of having to reveal proprietary
or confidential information that may affect their competitiveness.
Companies that contemplate launching a new product, for example,
may not want to disclose such information before the launch. Where
managers drive the issuer's decisions, differences among managers
and their preference to engage in opportunistic behavior may also ex-
ist. Not all managers may direct their companies to issue securities in
countries with relatively lax insider-trading and disclosure laws. If the
firm is issuing securities that it believes will be favorably received by
the market, and if the manager is not seeking opportunities for self-
dealing, the firm may prefer a regime with tough disclosure require-
ments in order to achieve the most favorable pricing-i.e., the lowest
possible discount factor.
Furthermore, in some countries, other sources of law, apart from
securities regulation, may regulate managerial opportunism. State
corporate law in the United States provides several limits on opportu-
nism. The duty of loyalty, for example, requires managers to act in
good faith on behalf of firms;40 pursuant to the business judgment
rule, courts may, at least to a limited extent, scrutinize actions taken
by managers to ensure fidelity to the interests of current sharehold-
ers.4 1 In addition, through contracting, some shareholders may devise
compensation mechanisms that decrease the incentive of managers to
engage in insider trading and limits the ability of managers to trade in
the issuer's securities. Finally, even where managers may want to is-
sue securities abroad opportunistically, the desire to maintain a do-
mestic base of shareholders and other business reasons may limit their
ability to do so.
Similarly, investors may be able to put in place mechanisms to re-
duce the incentives of fund managers to engage in opportunistic be-
havior. Some fund managers may be compensated based solely on the
performance of their investment portfolios. Others may be more or
40. See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 141-50 (1986) (describing the corporate
duty of loyalty).
41. See id. at 123-25.
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less restricted in their ability to trade for their own account.42 Differ-
ences may also exist in the incentive and ability of investors to assess
the value of securities. Larger, more sophisticated investors may en-
joy greater economies of scale in researching securities and have cor-
respondingly greater expertise. Small, individual investors, conversely
may lack such resources and depend more on formal legal regulations
and protections in assessing securities.
Finally, countries themselves may differ in the "natural" domestic
size of the capital markets. Some rather large economies may start
with a relatively large number of domestic firms. All other things be-
ing equal, such firms may desire to raise capital domestically due to
several natural advantages of their home country. First, building a do-
mestic shareholder base may be cheaper to the extent domestic share-
holders know more about the company and therefore are willing to
discount the represented value by less. Second, greater numbers of
domestic shareholders may also increase the political clout of the firm
in domestic politics. Third, more domestic shareholders may raise
awareness of the company among potential domestic customers of the
company. Finally, raising capital domestically may entail fewer
unknowns and uncertainties for the domestic company. Of course, to
the extent an appreciable cost difference driven by differences in regu-
latory regimes exists, domestic companies may seek to raise capital
abroad. Nevertheless, each country enjoys some amount of natural
advantage with respect to its own issuers and investors; where regula-
tory regimes are similar, firms will gravitate toward their natural, do-
mestic market.
Given these differences among issuers, investors, and countries,
countries may not all pursue the same regulatory regime. Rather than
racing to the top or bottom, countries may adopt a diverse range of
regulatory regimes, leading to what is referred to as a "separating
equilibrium." The following section first discusses possible equilibria
in instances where issuers and countries vary in their composition, and
then discusses the outcome where investors and countries vary in their
composition. Although the assumption that all issues are identical is
relaxed, it is important to keep in mind that the framework developed
in part L.A continues to apply to each "type" of security, making it
possible to analyze each type of security in exactly the way that we
analyzed securities as a whole in parts L.A and B.
1. Heterogeneous Issuers and Countries
Suppose that there are two types of securities issues. For "type A"
securities, a relatively high level of disclosure is the ideal level ("high
42. For example, fund managers in certain countries may be constrained by indus-
try-driven limits on their ability to conduct their own trades. See Sara Calian, Fund
Industry to Unveil Rules on Personal Trades, Wall St. J., May 9, 1994, at C1, Cl
(discussing possible proposals being considered in the United States).
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disclosure"). This is so because the relevant firms possess few secrets
that they need to protect from competitors and can meet the high dis-
closure standards at low cost. Furthermore, the disclosed information
is valuable to investors and will lead to positive inferences regarding
the value of the securities.43 For "type B" securities, on the other
hand, the ideal level of disclosure is much lower ("low disclosure").
This may be because it is costly for firms to comply, they have secrets
that will be revealed if they must satisfy a "high disclosure" regime, or
the information that would be disclosed is either not critical to inves-
tors or will be regarded as negative information by investors."
Consider the optimal strategy for an isolated country (country 1)
facing this environment that wants to set its regulatory regime. As-
sume for the moment that country 1 is closed. This country will
choose the regime that maximizes the value of transactions within its
jurisdiction. Depending on the relative proportion of type A or type
B securities, the regime will be relatively more favorable to one of the
two types of firms.45
Suppose that given the two types of securities, regulations are set at
the level that maximizes volume within country 1 (i.e., the regulatory
ideal). Normally, regulations set at a lower level would result in the
supply curve as a whole shifting down less than the demand curve
shifts, reducing the overall securities volume. Note, however, that for
the type B sub-segment of the market, the supply curve may actually
shift downward by an amount greater than the demand curve shifts
down. The type B subset bears disproportionately high costs from
mandatory disclosure and, therefore, will experience a greater down-
ward shift in its supply curve than the type A subset as disclosure reg-
ulations are relaxed. In other words, a lower level of regulation will
be inefficient for type A securities and for the overall market, but it
will increase the efficiency of type B transactions, leading to an in-
crease in the number of such transactions.
Now consider international capital mobility. Assume that countries
differ both in the size of their domestic markets and in the composi-
tion of firms within their jurisdiction. Suppose that country 1 has a
large domestic securities supply with relatively more type A issues
while country 2 is small with relatively more type B issues. Country 2
may seek to expand its securities volume by tailoring its regime to-
wards type B issues. Although country 2 may lose some type A issues,
43. It may also be the case that the management has few opportunities to engage
in opportunism-implying that the additional constraint of high disclosure is not
costly.
44. In addition, high disclosure would be costly to managers who would lose cer-
tain opportunities to extract value from the firm.
45. Of course, an individual country may attempt to devise a separate regime for
each type of security. Such efforts will not succeed, however, to the extent that a wide
range of different types exist or no easy means exist for regulators to distinguish be-
tween the types.
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the greater volume of type B issues from country 1 may completely
outweigh this effect.
Country 1 then has a choice of how to respond to country 2's oppor-
tunistic grab for securities volume. Country 1 may resign itself to los-
ing type B issues and tailor its regime even more toward type A issues,
leading to a different regime in each of the countries. We refer to this
outcome as a "separating equilibrium." Type A and type B issues will
shift their offerings to the countries offering them the most favorable
regulations. In a world of perfect capital mobility, country 1 would be
host to all type A transactions while all type B transactions would take
place within country 2. In such a world, investors would be able to
identify the high and low disclosure regimes and, therefore, be able to
distinguish type A and type B issues based on the country in which
they choose to issue their securities, ensuring that investors will dis-
count the value of these securities appropriately.
With mobility, some countries may tailor their regimes specifically
to attract those issuers that experience a relatively high cost from a
stringent disclosure regime. Similarly, some countries may seek to tai-
lor their regimes toward managers that wish to engage in opportunis-
tic behavior. Investors will assume that companies that voluntarily
select a low disclosure regime either bear a high cost from disclosure
or else intend to overstate their represented value. Similarly, if the
transaction is to take place in a country with stringent regulations, in-
vestors will recognize that the seller submitted to a great deal of dis-
closure, suggesting that there is less cause to worry about the firm's
represented value.
Because investors will be able to distinguish type A issues from type
B issues, the existence of two separate and identifiable regimes under
which securities can be issued may increase the efficiency of the mar-
ket, even when compared to the outcome of a race-to-the-top. There-
fore, securities may be priced more accurately and at lower cost.
Once the fact that all issuers are not identical is recognized, it is easy
to see that there is no single "most efficient" regime for all issuers. A
mechanism that forces issuers to identify the quality of their issue
would be more efficient than any regime. A separating equilibrium
does exactly this because countries attempt to capture segments of the
global securities market. Within each national market, therefore,
there is a smaller range of issuers which allows investors to assess the
quality of a given issue more accurately.
From a global point of view, this analysis suggests that diversity in
national regimes may be better than any single regime. The benefit of
diversity is not simply that "it fosters experimentation and innovation
using differing regulatory approaches .... [so that] approaches that
prove to be efficient regulatory devices can lead the way for other
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nations to follow."46 Nor is it merely that it leads to regulatory com-
petition that can moderate national laws that are either too strong or
too weak.47 Rather, diversity may serve an important role by signal-
ing to investors the quality of an issue, therefore making each individ-
ual transaction more efficient.1
In the extreme, if there are a large number of different countries,
and potential issues are not merely "type A" issues and "type B" is-
sues, but rather are located along a spectrum of possible types, a sepa-
rating equilibrium could arise with numerous regimes. As the number
of regimes grows, the accuracy with which the issuers self-identify the
quality of their issue when they choose a market for that issue also
grows. With a large enough number of regimes, it may be the case
that the main function of disclosure would be to induce the issuer to
select the "correct" regime and, thereby, to demonstrate the quality of
the issue. The actual disclosure would offer the investor relatively lit-
tle information that would not be conveyed by the choice of regime."
Unfortunately, a separating equilibrium is not the only possible re-
sult. Instead of a separating equilibrium, groups of countries may
46. See Cox, supra note 10, at 158.
47. See id at 158-59.
48. Of course, too great a range of regimes may result in added costs of compli-
ance for companies seeking to issue securities in multiple jurisdictions. See e.g.,
Trachtman, supra note 27, at 79 (advocating reduction of barriers to international
issues). Particularly where two different countries' regimes are radically different,
such added costs may pose a significant barrier to capital formation. Smaller coun-
tries may in fact respond to this pressure by adjusting their own regime to match that
of a larger neighbor. Canada, for example, in recent years has moved its own regime
much closer to that of the United States. See Cally Jordan, Regulation of Canadian
Capital Markets in the 1990s: The United States in the Driver's Seat, 4 Pac. Rim L &
Pol'y J. 577, 590-95 (1995) (discussing how the adoption of the Multi-Jurisdictional
Disclosure System between the United States and Canada has resulted in a shift in
Canada's securities regime toward that of the United States). Nevertheless, the bene-
fit still exists from the competitive pressure that some amount of diversity entails.
The increased compliance cost that may result from diversity simply means that some
middle level of diversity is desirable and will result in world equilibrium.
49. One caveat is in order. If several countries have similarly stringent regimes
but differ in the details of those regimes, a firm may be able to choose to issue its
shares in the country that is least likely to require disclosure of the particular informa-
tion the issuer would prefer to keep hidden. An important problem with any system
of diverse regulations or diverse intermediaries is that it allows the issuer to decide
where to issue. This would not present a problem if regulation were simply a matter
of "more" or "less" disclosure, but it is not. Because two regimes may have very
similar disclosure requirements when taken in the aggregate, but may differ in signifi-
cant details, management may benefit from forum shopping. For example, if country
1 has relatively tough insider trading rules but relatively lax rules regarding disclosure
of, say, potential future liability, while country 2, which features an overall system of
securities regulation that is very similar to country l's, has relatively lax insider trad-
ing rules but tough liability disclosure rules, we would expect issuers to take advan-
tage of these differences. Issuers would choose-on the margin-to issue in the
country that requires less disclosure in the areas in which they are "weak." Insiders
who are dealing in the firm's stock will issue in country 2 while firms that anticipate
the future liability claims against them will issue in country 1.
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gravitate toward a single, common regime, a result referred to as a
pooling equilibrium. In the case where country 2 tailors its regime to
capture the type B issuers, country 1 may adjust its regime towards
accommodating type B issuers in an attempt to maintain its volume,
leading to a pooling equilibrium where each country has the same re-
gime. In a world without any "natural" advantage to the domestic
country, however, this pooling equilibrium is unstable. To see this,
suppose that country 2 shifts its regime towards fewer regulations, in
favor of type B issuers. Unless country 1 shifts its regime to match
country 2's regime, however, type B issuers will flock to country 2
absent some natural tendency to remain in their domestic country.
Similarly, to the extent that country 1 does shift its regime in favor of
type B issuers and away from that desired by type A issuers, country 2
may reverse its strategy and attempt to win away type A issuers, again
leading to a separating equilibrium.
Where countries do possess a natural advantage in retaining domes-
tic issuers, even where issuers are permitted to move their activities
abroad, a pooling equilibrium may be both possible and stable. A
country's natural advantage essentially increases the cost to an issuer
of issuing securities abroad. At the extreme, where international mo-
bility is banned outright, this cost is infinite. Where mobility is al-
lowed, but other factors favor issuing securities domestically, this cost
is positive and may vary in magnitude. 50 A large natural advantage
allows a country with a large domestic securities market to react to the
regulatory strategies of other countries by tailoring its own regime
more towards targeted subsegments without losing the remainder of
the market. Assume for example, once again, that two countries exist:
countries 1 and 2. Country 1 has a large domestic market comprised
of two types of issuers, A and B. Suppose further that country l's
market has ninety percent type A and ten percent type B issuers.
Now consider the case where country 2 attempts to tailor its regime
specifically for type B issuers. Even with this tailored regime, some
type B issuers may still choose to remain with country 1 due to coun-
try l's natural advantage. Furthermore, country 1 may react by shift-
ing its own regime more towards type B issuers; to the extent its
natural advantage cost is high enough, country 1 may thereby retain is
type B issuers without losing any type A issuers to competing
countries.
Unlike the separating equilibrium that provides investors with more
information about the nature of different securities issuers, thereby
raising global welfare, pooling equilibria may reduce global welfare.
50. For example, domestic investors may have more information on domestic issu-
ers and therefore discount offerings by less. Domestic issuers may also be more famil-
iar with their home country securities laws and clearance and settlement system.
Greater numbers of domestic shareholders may also increase the market overall for
the issuer's products.
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Where different subsegments of issuers and investors exist, for exam-
ple, competing countries may target those groups which are least
served by their domestic country's regime. Compared to the case of
homogeneous parties, therefore, international competition that cre-
ates a pooling equilibrium may result in countries selecting regimes
aimed more toward fringe groups than otherwise. Although better
perhaps than the purely domestic case where individual countries
adopt regimes radically different from the global ideal, the interna-
tional pooling equilibrium nevertheless fails to maximize global wel-
fare. The danger posed by a pooling equilibrium is limited, however,
by the fact that it requires some natural cost advantage in the domes-
tic regime. Such a cost advantage is, of course, a barrier to capital
mobility.
In summary, the presence of a pooling or separating equilibrium
depends on three factors. First, the greater the mobility of issuers, the
greater the possibility that other countries may seek to capture the
business of particular subsets of the issuers, breaking down the pool-
ing equilibrium. Greater numbers of international market alternatives
also increases the probability of a separating equilibrium. For exam-
ple, in the case of a pooling equilibrium involving two countries, a
third international market may choose to tailor its regime to satisfy
the low-cost-of-disclosure issuers, forcing the initial home country to
choose either to remain with the low-cost or high-cost issuers or risk
losing both sets of firms.
Second, the greater the natural advantage a country has with re-
spect to its domestic issuers, the greater the likelihood is that the
country will be able to maintain some intermediate, non-tailored re-
gime and still retain its securities volume. Returning to the example
discussed above, to the extent both type A and type B issues in coun-
try 1 are issued domestically due to the importance of maintaining
domestic shareholders and due to the uncertainties inherent in invest-
ing under a foreign regime, country 1 may be able to successfully ad-
just its regime incrementally toward type B issues and ward off the
tailored regime within country 2.
Finally, the greater the number of alternative securities markets, the
higher the probability is that a separating equilibrium will result. In
particular, as the number of established securities markets with well-
known regimes, reliable transfer and payment systems, and other legal
infrastructure increases, the natural advantage countries may enjoy
will decrease and thus the probability of a race-to-the-top separating
equilibrium is enhanced. Lower natural barriers to mobility, in turn,
will result in more competition among countries to tailor their regimes
to specific types of issuers, further promoting the likelihood of a sepa-
rating equilibrium outcome.
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2. Heterogeneous Investors and Countries
The analysis for heterogeneous investors mirrors that for heteroge-
neous issuers. Where investors differ in their preferences for particu-
lar securities regimes-for example, where some fraction of issuers
are driven by fund managers seeking to engage in opportunistic be-
havior-two types of equilibria may result. First, a separating equilib-
rium may occur in which different countries tailor their regimes to
particular types of investors. Individual investors may then use the
signal from the fund manager's selection of a country to infer informa-
tion on the fund manager's incentives and preferences for opportunis-
tic behavior. Second, a pooling equilibrium may result where larger
countries use their natural advantage to retain all types of investors
within their borders.
Whether a pooling or separating equilibrium results depends, in
turn, on the mobility of investors. The more mobile investors are, the
more countries with large numbers of non-opportunistic fund manag-
ers lose as they mimic the regime in opportunistic-tailored countries.
Investor mobility, therefore, raises the likelihood of a separating equi-
librium. Similarly, the greater the number of international alternative
markets, the greater the likelihood is that some markets will choose to
tailor themselves for the non-opportunistic fund managers, resulting
again in a separating equilibrium. Finally, the lower the natural ad-
vantage particular countries have in retaining domestic fund manag-
ers, the greater the possibility is that a separating equilibrium results.
3. Implications for Domestic Securities Regulation
The framework developed in this Article, based on a range of heter-
ogeneous issuers, investors, and countries applies also to the domestic
context. In theory, investors benefit from any situation where multi-
ple regimes-for example, the individual states within the United
States-compete for a heterogeneous set of investors and issuers.
Through this competition, neither a race-to-the-top nor a race-to-the-
bottom will necessarily occur. Rather, to the extent that no individual
state has too great a natural advantage with respect to its own issuers
and investors, a separating equilibrium will arise where particular
states tailor themselves toward particular types of issuers and inves-
tors. Investors may then look to the state with which a particular is-
suer decides to associate in order to determine the relative risk of
fraud and the merits of the offering.
Despite the theoretical similarity between international regulatory
competition and competition between different intra-country regimes,
most countries typically have only one national securities regime. Two
reasons explain this pattern. First, within any one country, the range
of different issuers and investors may not be as great as across differ-
ent countries. Where other sources of law within one country ade-
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quately control for managerial opportunism, for example, the range of
different issuer incentives within the country may be minimal. Simi-
larly, the differences among investors within one country may be less
than the range across different countries. As a result, a pooling equi-
librium between different intra-country regimes is more likely. Be-
cause issuers and investors are relatively similar, no one state will be
able to gain enough of a market share to make catering to a particular
segment worthwhile. Where the pooling equilibrium results in a less
than optimal securities regime and most investors and issuers desire a
similar level of regulation, a national securities regime may be
justified.
Second, even where individual intra-country regimes are free to
compete, the market may not value the potential diversity from such
competition. To the extent that it is costly for each state in the United
States to organize and establish its own separate regulatory regime,
states will do so only where enough issuers or investors choose to is-
sue securities under the state's regime. Where issuers and investors
are relatively similar, then the state will obtain only those issuers and
investors for which it has a natural advantage-for example, issuers
and investors located within the particular state. Given the ease of
communication and transacting business within one country, however,
most intra-country regimes will not even enjoy this natural advantage.
Therefore, even where a range of issuers and investors exist, to the
extent that other states have already provided for these issuers' and
investors' preferences, a new regime will not attract enough volume to
justify its expense. As a result, a natural limit exists on the amount of
diversity that may occur within one country. In many countries, the
presence of a single securities regime may result.
Across several countries, this natural limit also implies that several
but not an infinite number of different types of regimes may arise. We
do not argue that diversity in regimes is a good in and of itself.
Rather, we argue that the global securities market should be free to
determine for itself-through a market-based competitive process be-
tween regimes-the amount of diversity in regimes. The market will
then balance the benefit to issuers and investors from multiple re-
gimes against the cost to different countries of maintaining a com-
pletely different level of regulation. Moreover, as the next part
discusses, even if arguments do exist that some coordination between
regimes may be theoretically worthwhile, the practical difficulties in
international cooperation make regulatory competition a better alter-
native to devising a global regulatory system.
I. RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY PROBLEMS
Where individual countries engage in a race-to-the-top in their se-
curities regimes or, more realistically, generate a separating equilib-
rium, there is only a limited role for international cooperative efforts
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at regulation. Short of information sharing and other enforcement-
related cooperation there is no need to establish a cooperative regime.
Even in the absence of a negotiated agreement, countries fashioning
separate regimes will act to maximize the welfare of issuers and inves-
tors on a global scale.51 As the analysis in part I demonstrates, how-
ever, in the case of managers acting opportunistically in the simple
race-to-the-bottom model or in the heterogeneous scenario's pooling
equilibria, individual country regulations may not advance global wel-
fare. This part discusses several possible responses to the race-to-the-
bottom problem and harmful pooling equilibria. First, the extraterri-
torial application of national laws-in particular, the approach taken
by the United States antifraud rules-is examined. Up to this point
this Article has implicitly assumed that any regulation adopted by a
country would serve to regulate all transactions within the territory of
that country. Under this rule of territoriality, the issuer and investor
may avoid the jurisdiction of any country simply by moving their
transaction abroad. Territoriality, however, is not the only possible
method of determining which countries' laws apply to a given transac-
tion. In this part consideration will be given to how different jurisdic-
tional standards affect the rules implemented by national governments
and, thereby affect the mobility of issuers and investors. This part
then considers the effectiveness of cooperative agreements and efforts
to create supranational regulatory bodies aimed at combating races-
to-the-bottom and pooling equilibria in the international regulatory
context.
A. The Reach of the Antifraud Rules
The Exchange Act restricts the reach of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 only through its requirement that interstate commerce be used.52
The exact extent of this reach, however, is not specified in the Act.
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to employ "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," "by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails" in
"the purchase or sale, of any security. '5 3 Section 3(a)(17) of the Ex-
change Act, in turn, defines interstate commerce as "trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or be-
51. Joel P. Trachtman, among others, argues that some international cooperation
is necessary to enforce even one country's securities laws. See Trachtman, supra note
27, at 70-71. As we argue in part II.B, infra, however, certain forms of cooperation
may be harmful.
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). In 1948, the Commission adopted Rule lOb-
5, which provides an enforcement mechanism for section 10(b).
The reach of the Securities Act antifraud rules, including section 11 and 12(a)(2),
are governed under Regulation S. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The
Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Laws, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
207, 214-16 (1996).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
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tween any foreign country and any State, or between any State and
any place or ship outside thereof;" 4 section 30(b) of the Exchange
Act, furthermore, exempts from the Exchange Act's provisions "any
person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the juris-
diction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe."55 The SEC, however, has not clarified the reach of Rule
10b-5 outside the United States. Instead, the task of determining the
reach of section 10(b) has been left to courts, which have grappled
with the issue of extraterritoriality on a case-by-case basis.
Today, therefore, the question remains unanswered: To what extent
can American laws govern activity that takes place outside its bor-
ders? Courts have applied two primary tests to answer this question:
the conduct test and the effects test. Each test is described below. 56
1. The Conduct Test (Territoriality)
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.57 is the most important
American case to adopt the principle of territoriality. In that case, an
American plaintiff filed an antitrust action against an American de-
fendant, alleging that violations of the antitrust laws of the United
States had taken place in Costa Rica.5 Justice Holmes, writing for the
Court, concluded that "the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done. ' 59 This basis for jurisdiction, based on the location of the par-
ties' conduct, has become known as the conduct test.
Under the conduct test, jurisdiction is conferred based on the loca-
tion of relevant events. In the case of a securities transaction, there-
fore, jurisdiction can be avoided by moving the transaction to another
location. The territoriality standard is the simplest of the possible ju-
risdictional rules because it divides the world neatly into separate
legal regimes. Every country legislates with respect to its own geo-
graphic territory.
The reach of the conduct test is, of course, dependent upon what
actions are considered to constitute "conduct" for jurisdictional pur-
poses. In a securities transaction, for example, many actions may lead
up to the ultimate transaction. Telephone calls may cross jurisdic-
tional boundaries, attorneys may conduct cross-border investigations,
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1994).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1994).
56. Additionally, the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States provides guidance on extraterritoriality. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (1987); see also Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of
the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1, 37-39 (1992) (ana-
lyzing the Third Restatement).
57. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
58. Id at 354-55.
59. Id. at 356.
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and funds may flow internationally. A workable conduct test, there-
fore, must specify the amount and type of conduct that is necessary in
order to trigger jurisdiction. United States Circuit Courts are split on
how to answer this question. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit established a very restrictive requirement in Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc.,6 ° in which it was held that the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in
the United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of
material importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident
abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material
importance in the United States have significantly contributed
thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act)
within the United States directly caused such losses.6
1
In other words, jurisdiction is not conferred by "merely preparatory"
acts if it is foreigners that are injured abroad, but may be sufficient
when Americans are injured.62  The Bersch test was eventually
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Zoelsch v.
Arthur Anderson & Co.63
In contrast, other Circuits, including the Third, Eighth, and Ninth,
have adopted a broader standard for the assertion of jurisdiction. 64
These Circuits have held that jurisdiction is conferred upon the
United States whenever conduct occurred in the United States that
furthered a fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to its
accomplishment. 65 Under this broader form of the conduct test,
therefore, even preparatory acts such as making initial phone calls and
60. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 993.
62. Il at 992; see also IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1980) (clarify-
ing the distinction between acts that are merely preparatory and those that directly
cause injury).
63. 824 F.2d 27, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that "we adopt what we understand to
be the Second Circuit's test"). The D.C. Circuit interprets the Second Circuit test to
mean that "jurisdiction will lie in American courts where the domestic conduct com-
prises all the elements of a defendant's conduct necessary to establish a violation of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." See id. at 31.
64. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty., Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that "where defendants' conduct in the United States
was in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to its ac-
complishment ... the district court has subject matter jurisdiction"); SEC v. Kasser,
548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977) (requiring that "at least
some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country").
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Continental Grain test in Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz,
712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983). For a more detailed discussion of the conduct test in
the context of securities regulation, see Kelley Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation:
Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 927, 934-35 (1994).
65. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 111-12.
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soliciting potential foreign investors in the United States may confer
jurisdiction.
Problems exist, however, with the implementation of either form of
conduct test. Where significant conduct occurs in more than one juris-
diction, conflict may exist between the jurisdictions applying a con-
duct-based rule of territoriality. Two countries, for example, may
have enough activity within their borders to trigger conduct-based ju-
risdiction under the Zoelsch rule. This is particularly true for transac-
tions involving securities, an essentially intangible product. Offers
and sales of securities may occur simultaneously across the borders of
two countries. A seller located in the United States, for example, may
telephone buyers located in Sweden to complete a sales transaction.
Furthermore, the conduct test offers little guidance for determining
what acts are central to the transaction and what are merely
preparatory.
2. The Effects Test (Extraterritoriality)
Although territoriality is the simplest basis of jurisdiction, many
countries, the United States among them, do not use a pure version of
territoriality to limit the reach of their securities laws. In fact, jurisdic-
tion is often asserted aggressively.6 Within the United States, the
seminal case dealing with antifraud securities regulation is
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.67 In Schoenbaum, the plaintiff was an
American shareholder of Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian corporation. The
plaintiff claimed that Banff Oil's controlling shareholders had ar-
ranged to have the corporation sell them its own shares at less than
market value. This action, argued the plaintiff, constituted a violation
of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.68 Although the entirety of the
transaction at issue took place within Canada, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that:
[T]he district court has subject matter jurisdiction over violations of
the Securities Exchange Act although the transactions which are al-
leged to violate the Act take place outside the United States, at
least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a
national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of
American investors.69
In defense of its holding, the Schoenbaum court stated that the sale of
undervalued stock in Canada would unduly depress stock listed on the
66. See John C. Maguire, Regulatory Conflicts: International Tender and Exchange
Offers in the 1990s, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 939, 949 (1992); Offshore Offers and Sales, 53
Fed. Reg. 22,661, 22,662 (1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230).
67. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), affd in part rev'd in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968),
cerL denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
68. Id. at 204. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the insiders had purchased the
shares based on information not yet disclosed to the public. Id.
69. Id. at 208.
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American Exchange, thereby generating enough of an effect on the
United States market to justify United States jurisdiction.70
Schoenbaum, therefore, applied jurisdiction not based on any con-
duct which occurred within the United States but based, at least in
part, on the effect of the transaction on the United States capital mar-
ket. Note, however, that although Schoenbaum is cited as an example
of the effects test, the court did not go so far as to conclude that an
effect on American investors, without more, is a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction. Instead, the court suggested that a listing on a United
States exchange is an important element in generating the effect on
the United States capital markets required to justify jurisdiction. Nev-
ertheless, the principle of Schoenbaum's effects test has been followed
in several other cases.7 '
With respect to the framework that this Article has laid out, the
adoption of the effects test as a means of establishing extraterritorial
jurisdiction of a country's laws has the effect of reducing the mobility
of investors.72 Regardless of the location of the transaction, the ef-
fects test will bring that transaction under the jurisdiction of the coun-
try in which investors live.
Countries may attempt to justify such extraterritorial application of
their domestic laws as one response to the race-to-the-bottom. Coun-
try 1, for example, may react to pressures from country 2 to reduce its
regulatory regime in favor of opportunistic managers in one of two
ways. It may itself engage in a race-to-the-bottom, adjusting its own
regulatory regime to retain the opportunistic managers. Alterna-
tively, country 1 may choose to extend the application of its laws to
70. See id. at 208-09.
71. See, e.g., SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that
trading "on the basis of inside information, options of a United States corporation
listed exclusively on a United States stock exchange... created the near certainty that
United States shareholders... would be adversely affected"); Des Brisay v. Goldfield
Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he transaction in question ... involved
the improper use of securities ... registered and listed on a national exchange and
adversely affected not only the plaintiffs but also the American market .... ).
72. Note also that the cost of applying one's laws extraterritorially varies from
country to country. In particular, countries with smaller domestic securities markets
will experience a greater cost when applying their laws extraterritorially through a
broad effects test than larger countries. To see why this is so, suppose that all coun-
tries except country 1 allow the sale of securities to their citizens without compliance
with their own securities laws, so long as the transaction takes place in a foreign coun-
try's market. Country 1, on the other hand, allows the sale of securities to its citizens
only if its securities laws are satisfied, regardless of where the transaction takes place.
If country 1 is a small country, the issuer is likely to prefer the small loss of liquidity
that comes from simply not selling to citizens of country 1 to the costs of satisfying the
regulatory regime in country 1. On the other hand, if country 1 represents a large
capital market, refusing to sell to its citizens may reduce the market that is available
to the issuer and make it more difficult to sell the issue. It may be cheaper to comply
with the regulations in country 1 than to lose citizens of country 1 as potential inves-
tors. Countries with larger domestic securities markets, therefore, will have greater
success in extending their jurisdiction abroad.
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cover those domestic issuers and managers that seek to engage in op-
portunistic behavior abroad, eliminating the gain to these parties from
shifting their financing efforts overseas.
A large country like the United States, for example, is able to re-
duce the pressure of the race-to-the-bottom because its capital market
is important and because it has tremendous international influence.
The effects tests ensures that American law will be applied extraterri-
torially in many circumstances, significantly reducing the mobility of
American investors in at least two ways. First, extraterritoriality pre-
vents the investors from escaping the dictates of American law. Even
if the American securities regime is suboptimal, investors cannot go
abroad to take advantage of more favorable regimes because if the
effects are felt here, the investor is subject to United States jurisdic-
tion. Second, American investors who wish to invest abroad, despite
the fact that American regulations continue to apply to them, may be
denied the opportunity to buy securities. Issuers who prefer not to
comply with United States law must refuse to sell to American resi-
dents. By applying its laws extraterritorially, the United States
reduces the mobility of its investors which can reduce the pressure to
conform American law to the regulatory ideal as discussed in part
II.B. As capital mobility lessens, countries move closer to the purely
domestic situation, with all its accompanying problems. For example,
without the pressure of international capital competition, individual
countries may cater to the interests of the bureaucrats charged with
overseeing the regulation of securities. Likewise, a suboptimal regime
may result from mistake or inertia, and without external pressures for
change it will remain suboptimal.
Most importantly for our present purposes, extraterritorial applica-
tion of national laws discourages a desirable separating equilibrium.
If the laws of, for example, the United States, apply to many transac-
tions by American firms and to many sales to American investors, it is
not possible for a country to attract a portion of those issues by adopt-
ing a regime that differs from the American one. Indeed, there is an
incentive to do exactly the opposite and adopt a regime that matches
the American one as closely as possible because this will reduce the
additional costs of compliance that firms face if they issue in that
country. A country could adopt strict disclosure requirements which
would set it apart from the American system, but because the Ameri-
can laws are among the most demanding in the world, most likely, the
segment of issuers and investors that would be attracted by an even
more demanding regime is minimal. Rather than encourage a sepa-
rating equilibrium, therefore, extraterritorialism encourages a conver-
gence in securities laws which, in turn, may provoke a race-to-the-
bottom.
A regime of territoriality, therefore, may better advance global wel-
fare. Greater territoriality combined with mobility of investors and
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issuers increases the likelihood of a beneficial separating equilibrium.
As discussed below, the degree of mobility that issuers and investors
are granted is of key importance in determining the optimal extrater-
ritorial reach of a country's laws. A world comprised of strict territo-
rial regimes with clear and relatively inexpensive means for parties to
opt-out of the domestic regime will provide the greatest pressure on
countries to generate a separating equilibrium of different securities
regimes, to the benefit of all investors.
B. Cooperative Agreements
Cooperative international agreements offer an alternate possible
mechanism for encouraging an efficient global regulatory regime. The
United States, for example, through the 1980s and into the 1990s, has
pursued an active effort to obtain agreements from several different
countries to impose an insider trading regime similar to the one in
place in the United States. As a result of this pressure, several coun-
tries, including Japan and Switzerland, have instituted similar re-
gimes.73 The limited success of the American efforts, however, reveals
several problems with cooperative agreements as a solution to the po-
tential race-to-the-bottom and pooling equilibria problems.
First, international accords on substantive regulatory issues are
often vulnerable to pressure from political interest groups. Once an
international regulatory agreement is in place, the actual operation of
the agreement becomes open to political maneuvering and rent-seek-
ing. Managers seeking to gain from insider trading may shift to coun-
tries where insider trading laws-although present due to an
agreement with the United States-may not be enforced vigorously.74
Countries seeking to attract such managers may, in turn, have an in-
centive to favor underenforcement. Particularly as time passes from
the initial passage of such an agreement, less attention will focus on
the substantive issues behind the accord, making it easier to frustrate
the agreement through reduced enforcement or through regulatory
adjustments to the agreement. Moreover, where agreements are im-
73. Canada and the United States also entered into a bilateral agreement in 1991,
the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, with respect to offering information disclo-
sure requirements. Under the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, Canadian issu-
ers may issue securities in the United States while complying with Canadian
registration and disclosure requirements so long as the issuer's financial statements
conform to the United States's generally accepted accounting principles. Note, how-
ever, that even under the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, Canadian issuers in
the United States are still subject to United States antifraud laws. See SEC Release
No. 33-6902, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (1991) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 201, 210, 229,
230, 239, 240, 249, 260, 269).
74. Evidence exists, for example, that neither Japan nor Switzerland actively en-
force their United States-styled insider trading laws. See Tokyo Exchange Puts Out
Insider-Trading Warning, Wall St. J., June 18, 1987, at 45 ("While insider trading in a
broad sense is illegal under Japanese law, regulations and enforcement mechanisms
lag behind those of other countries.").
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posed primarily for the benefit of other countries, or where such
agreements create large positive externalities for parties outside the
country, specific countries may have an incentive to shirk their en-
forcement responsibilities.
Second, to the extent substantive agreements impose rules not
honed from competitive pressures but rather imposed by expert bu-
reaucrats, such rules may suffer from the same problems as regulatory
regimes in isolated countries. In particular, the rules may be tailored
to benefit bureaucrats charged with regulating securities or may not
maximize the welfare of all parties. To the extent SEC bureaucrats
benefit from maximizing the size and importance of their own agency,
for example, SEC-negotiated agreements may be too complex or may
overregulate. Some commentators, in fact, argue that the SEC pushed
strongly for United States-styled insider trading laws in foreign juris-
dictions to increase the SEC's own stature and responsibility."5 Bu-
reaucrats may also seek to maximize the benefit to certain regulated
groups. As suggested by public choice theorist's capture theory,
agency bureaucrats may cause international agreements to favor the
interests of the politically-connected few over the diffuse majority of
interested parties.
The problems just discussed are, admittedly, also present in a do-
mestic securities regime. Other problems exist, however, that are
unique to efforts at international cooperation. For example, interna-
tional cooperative agreements are often difficult and time consuming
to obtain. Each substantive agreement must be negotiated separately.
Furthermore, the greater the number of substantive points at issue,
the greater the possibility that countries may differ in their approaches
and preferences. Countries often negotiate over several different
points covering multiple substantive areas simultaneously. As a re-
sult, countries may horse trade and deviate from the optimal position
on any one particular securities regulatory issue in order to secure an
overall agreement. This, in turn, will both prolong negotiations and
possibly frustrate a cooperative solution. During the time such inter-
national accords are in flux, uncertainty may chill investor activity as
well as increase the incidence of the very activity the accord seeks to
regulate or prohibit. Insiders, for example, may have increased their
trades prior to the adoption of anti-insider trading provisions in Japan
and Switzerland to maximize their return in these countries.
In addition, countries may use international agreements to shield
themselves from pressures to race-to-the-top or to move toward a sep-
arating equilibrium, allowing groups of countries to pursue more op-
75. See James A. Kehoe, Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of
U.S. Insider Trading Laws Internationally, 9 Emory Int'l L Rev. 345, 358 (1995)
("Clearly the SEC has every incentive to expand its influence and ideology globally.
By extending the U.S. insider trading laws globally, the SEC increases its own interna-
tional prestige and responsibility, especially in the area of enforcement.").
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portunistic goals. For example, a coalition of states may be able to
agree on a set of substantive regulations that shield them from pres-
sures to diversify the level of securities regulation. If those countries
represent large enough capital markets, they may be able to adopt
extraterritorial jurisdictional rules, thereby forcing transactions to
take place within their borders even if those transactions might be
carried out more efficiently elsewhere or if the global regulatory re-
gime would be better served by a separating equilibrium. Paradoxi-
cally, therefore, a cooperative regime may, in certain cases, be worse
than if no coordination occurred whatsoever.
Finally, the amount of attention and energy devoted to fashioning
the ideal international cooperative agreement draws resources from
seeking out other solutions. For some regulators, the search for a ben-
eficial international cooperative agreement becomes itself the goal
rather than simply one means to further investor protection or capital
formation. During the decade the SEC spent cultivating insider trad-
ing laws throughout the world, for example, securities administrators
could have focused instead on different means of strengthening the
international capital markets as discussed below.
Thus, although a possible solution to the lack of international coop-
eration, cooperative substantive agreements may not represent the
most promising avenue for future activity.76 As will be discussed in
part III, this Article contends that each individual country's regulators
should therefore focus on changing the framework of that country's
regime-which may involve cooperation with respect to information
sharing, encouraging capital mobility, and the like. Regulators should
also promote the development of private, non-governmental mecha-
nisms designed to reduce the asymmetric information problem.
C. A Centralized, Supra-National Organization
Recently, commentators have proposed one additional alterna-
tive-to delegate the securities regulatory authority of individual
countries to regulate securities to one global regulatory body.77 An
extension of the concept of multinational substantive agreements, a
supra-national organization would be able to monitor world markets
and adjust its regulations accordingly. This organization would create
requirements that issues must meet, and implement corresponding
penalties for violating the requirements. The organization would also
76. But see Joel P. Trachtman, Recent Initiatives in International Financial Regula-
tion and Goals of Competitiveness, Effectiveness, Consistency and Cooperation, 12 Nw.
J. Int'l L. & Bus. 241 (1991) (arguing for greater international securities regulatory
cooperation).
77. See, e.g., Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities
Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 Harv. Int'l L.J. 185, 187
(1990) (arguing that a supranational organization may "promote regulatory harmony
through the coordination, development, and implementation of common standards").
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be charged with enforcing the rules, presumably through domestic
laws. Domestic laws could also piggy-back on the regulations; for ex-
ample, a law could state that compliance with the international re-
quirements is sufficient to comply with the domestic laws for issues
within its country.78
Such an organization would be able, at least in principle, to weigh
the costs and benefits of various regimes and adopt the optimal global
regime. Although there is little question that a well-organized and
well-managed supranational organization would offer an efficient se-
curities regulation regime,79 there are many practical hurdles that
make this option unrealistic, at least for the foreseeable future. First,
such an organization would require the consent and cooperation of
national governments, as well as the surrender of significant control to
the international organization. To date, efforts to undertake large
scale international cooperation on substantive issues of securities reg-
ulation have moved slowly, suggesting that countries are simply not
prepared to yield control over their securities regulation policies.
Second, such a system would lack the benefit of competition in deter-mining the ideal regulatory regime. In addition, the political battles
over control of the organization would be between nations-entities
not accustomed to deferring to other states or organizations. An in-
ternational regime would also be unable to harness the informational
advantages of having diversity among regulatory systems from which
issuers would select a regime. Finally, much like national securities
regimes, the supra-national organization would be vulnerable to cap-
ture or bureaucratic opportunism.
Whatever one's views on the desirability of a supranational organi-
zation, it is unrealistic to expect such an organization to be created in
the near future. As such, it is not a reasonable solution to today's
problems of international securities regulation.
D. Summary and Recommendation
Based on the analysis presented above, it is possible to make sev-
eral recommendations regarding the regulation of international secur-
78. Some examples of organizations that may eventually act as supranational se-
curities regulatory bodies include the World Trade Organization, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, and the European Community. The Council
of the European Community, for example, has sought to further the free-flow of capi-
tal within the European Community and to harmonize disclosure standards for com-
panies to list securities on European Community Exchanges. See Trachtman, supra
note 27, at 96 & nn.83-84. The Council of the European Community has also issued a
directive on minimum standards for insider trading laws within the European Com-
munity. See Warren, supra note 77, at 219-21.
79. Similarly, national securities regulations were optimal when capital flow was
primarily domestic. In the United States, for example, state law was found to be
inadequate in the 1930s, and national regulations were adopted in their place. The
move from national laws to international laws is analogous to the American move
from state laws to national laws.
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ities markets. In order to encourage a separating equilibrium that
allows the market to take advantage of the information revealed by an
issuer's choice of regime, national laws must allow capital to flow
freely across national borders.
Despite the challenges associated with fashioning a territorialist
rule, a strict territorialist rule makes it easy for parties to move their
transactions from one jurisdiction to another. For this reason, a terri-
torialist rule supports high mobility of both issuers and investors; as a
result, both the supply and demand curves in our framework are flat-
ter than they are under alternative jurisdictional rules. Due to this
increased mobility, global forces will exert greater pressure on na-
tional governments, making a race-to-the-ideal level of regulation
more likely. Under certain assumptions, as described in part I.B,
greater mobility may cause a race-to-the-bottom. Under more realis-
tic conditions, however, where issuers and investors vary in their in-
centives and countries are able to appeal to segments of the overall
securities market, increased mobility will tend to result in a desirable
separating equilibrium. To the extent that strict territorialist rules
raise this mobility, global welfare will also increase.
It is, of course, reasonable for countries to seek to protect the integ-
rity and efficiency of their own capital markets. Countries should be
free to adopt national rules that they feel are most advantageous to
them-and indeed, it is precisely this freedom that generates diversity
among regimes. Countries should also, however, refrain from adopt-
ing regulations that infringe on the rights of other countries to govern
their own markets. As long as investors are aware of the regime
under which they are investing, there is nothing to be gained, and
much to be lost by insisting that the laws of their own country apply to
them.8 0
The role of extraterritoriality, therefore, should be limited to situa-
tions where activities abroad will truly impact national markets. For
example, if insiders purchase shares in a firm for their own account at
a price below the fair market value, they are reducing the value of all
the firm's shares, wherever held. For this reason, a foreign regulatory
authority may wish to exercise jurisdiction over the transactions. On
the other hand, an issue that takes place in one jurisdiction and that
turns out to have been made fraudulently does not harm existing hold-
ers of the firm's securities located in other jurisdictions, and therefore,
foreign regulators should not seek jurisdiction."'
80. For a detailed discussion of why extraterritoriality does not succeed in protect-
ing national markets or investors, see Choi & Guzman, supra note 52, at 219-30.
81. See id. (discussing the role for extraterritorial jurisdiction in detail). Even in
situations that include the joint listing of securities there is rarely a justification for
extraterritorial application of a country's laws. Almost all legitimate regulatory con-
cerns can be addressed with less intrusive regulation. See id.
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In order to maximize the efficiency of the global securities market,
the territorialist rule should increase the ability of investors and issu-
ers to select their own regimes. Furthermore, the rule should allow
countries that institute regimes that attract both issuers and investors
to reap the benefits through increased securities volume. To do this,
the test must tie itself directly to the benefits of increased securities
volume. Countries benefit from greater volume through increased
fees, increased job creation, and greater domestic liquidity. There-
fore, transactions that increase such fees, provide more jobs, and in-
crease liquidity within a country, should be considered within the
territory of that country. For transactions that occur on exchanges or
are otherwise executed through some exchange system located within
one country, determining the territory is straightforward. Therefore,
we propose a clear and simple rule: all transactions that occur
through an exchange or organized market should be considered within
the exclusive jurisdictional reach of the country within which the ex-
change or organized market operates. For example, transactions that
occur within the London Stock Exchange, regardless of the nationality
of the participants, should be considered to take place in Great Brit-
ain and should be subject only to British law. This bright-line test
provides capital market participants with predictable application of
regulatory rules, thereby encouraging capital mobility. For the
residual number of transactions that take place off-exchange, a more
factor driven connection test may be necessary. This test may take
into account the nationality of the parties and the location of their
communications and payments.' This residual ambiguity would not
greatly affect the mobility of either investors or issuers. The parties
could simply choose to enter into exchange or market system based
transactions in order to place themselves clearly under the rules of
one territorial jurisdiction.83
Ill. REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
Given the problems with cooperative international agreements and
extraterritorial jurisdiction as responses to the challenge of interna-
tional securities regulation, this part now turns to the question of what
can and should be done to encourage an efficient international regula-
tory framework for securities markets. This part outlines two possible
alternatives to encourage optimal global regulation: (1) adjustments
to the international regulatory climate within which individual coun-
tries operate; and (2) the support of alternative private mechanisms
designed to protect investors and encourage capital formation.
82. This test would inevitably involve significant questions of comity.
83. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 52, at 228-38.
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A. Changing the Regulatory Climate
Part I.B outlined many of the factors that affect whether countries
will engage in a race-to-the-top, a race-to-the-bottom, or will find
themselves in a separating equilibrium. Governments may act either
individually or cooperatively to impact these factors.
In the simple model of homogeneous issuers and countries, part I.B
of this Article demonstrates that the mobility of both investors and
issuers is crucial in determining the pressure that regulators face to
adjust their regimes in the face of international regulatory competi-
tion, leading to either a race-to-the-top or a race-to-the-bottom. In
any one country, the greater the international mobility of investors
and issuers, the more incentive the country will have to impose and
maintain a regulatory regime designed to maximize the welfare of in-
vestors and firms (race-to-the-top) or their managers (race-to-the-
bottom).
Although mobility may exacerbate the race-to-the-bottom where all
parties are identical, to the extent that some range of investors, issu-
ers, and countries exist, mobility increases the pressure towards a sep-
arating equilibrium among different countries' regimes. Where full
investor and issuer mobility is achieved, a country can attract transac-
tions by adopting regulations that appeal to a particular type of issuer
and the investors interested in that type of issue. In fact, if there is
sufficient mobility, a country that attempts to please all types of issues
will attract none of them as each type seeks out more specialized re-
gimes. Efforts aimed at expanding the mobility of issuers and inves-
tors across country borders, therefore, may result in the generation of
desirable securities regimes, even in the non-cooperative context, by
promoting a separating equilibrium.
Countries acting individually or in concert may raise the mobility of
investors and issuers in at least three different ways.8 First, countries
may seek domestic changes and international cooperative agreements
to reduce direct barriers to the international flow of capital. Although
investors seeking to place funds in the United States capital markets
may generally do so without restriction, this is not true for many other
countries. Foreign investors seeking to invest in South Korea's capital
markets, for example, may do so only after approval from South Ko-
rea's Ministry of Finance.85 Foreign investors are also limited in the
84. It appears that countries are already trying to encourage international mobility
in capital markets. "[D]e-regulation is emerging as the approach of choice among
national securities regulators, although it is a de-regulation focused not on domestic
standards but rather on impediments to cross-border transactions that national regu-
lators have been pursuing with studied persistence." Samuel Wolff, Recent Develop-
ments in International Securities Regulations, 23 Deny. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 347, 351
(1995).
85. See S. Jane Rose, The New Wave of International Funds, 582 P.L.I. Corp. 123,
127 (1987).
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percentage of shares they may hold in any one Korean company. 6
Even the United States could do more to improve capital mobility.
Although investors are able to place their funds outside the United
States, oftentimes-according to the strictures contained in Regula-
tion S of the Securities Act-United States securities laws will follow
such placements.' For example, a Japanese company selling securi-
ties solely in Japan and operating only in Japan may nevertheless
come under the reach of United States securities laws to the extent
some of its investors are United States residents.' Similarly, the an-
tifraud rules that have emerged from the Exchange Act are applied to
conduct around the world. Either unilaterally or through agreements
with other countries, the United States could increase the mobility of
its investors by curtailing the reach of its own securities laws. At the
very least, the United States and other countries could act to reduce
the cost for issuers and investors to opt out of the United States re-
gime and select another country's regime to govern their
transaction. 9
International cooperative agreements focusing solely on investor
mobility, moreover, have several advantages over international sub-
stantive agreements. Unlike substantive agreements, that must deter-
mine the precise type and quantity of disclosure as well as the nature
of antifraud rules to apply across several different borders, interna-
tional mobility agreements need only focus on ensuring that issuers
and investors are able to enter and exit countries without difficulty.
As a result, unlike a more substantive international agreement, mobil-
ity agreements lead to fewer mistakes and are easier to negotiate.
Furthermore, once in place, mobility agreements present less danger
of subsequent rent-seeking. Substantive agreements are subject to the
risk that with changing political tides the agreement might come
under attack or renegotiation. In addition, to the extent an interna-
tional regulatory oversight body is created under a substantive agree-
ment, political pressure will arise for the oversight body to expand its
functions or serve the interests of specific interest groups. An agree-
ment providing only for the international mobility of issuers and in-
vestors, on the other hand, provides no further room for parties to
rent-seek. Rent-seekers have fewer dimensions to argue for changes
that might benefit one country over others.
86. See id.
87. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 52, at 215-16.
88. Regulation S provides a safe-harbor only for transactions not made with per-
sons in the United States. See Securities Act Rule 903(b), 902(i).
89. The justification for the international application of American laws is rarely
stated clearly, but is normally considered to focus on protection of American inves-
tors and American markets. For a discussion of why extraterritorial application as
currently practiced achieves neither of these goals, and why a regime with only very
limited exceptions to territoriality could achieve them, see Choi & Guzman, supra
note 52, at 219-30.
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Even in countries where investors have the legal ability to shift in-
vestments abroad, countries may wish to enter into bilateral reciproc-
ity agreements with other countries. Reciprocity agreements typically
provide that foreign issuers may list their stock on both domestic ex-
changes as well as raise capital within the domestic market so long as
they comply with their home country securities laws. Importantly,
such a reciprocity agreement should leave it up to the individual com-
pany whether to be governed by the host country's or its own coun-
try's laws. Former SEC Chairman Richard C. Bremen, in particular,
has criticized such agreements. He has argued that reciprocity places
domestic companies at a potential competitive disadvantage relative
to foreign issuers seeking capital and that such agreements will cause
investor confusion and reduce the ability of investors to compare dif-
ferent issues.9" Investors, however, already face a large choice of in-
vestments across different foreign markets, each with widely differing
securities regulatory regimes. Providing foreign companies and their
accompanying foreign regulatory regimes with easier access to the
United States simply reduces the transaction cost for domestic inves-
tors to actually purchase foreign securities. United States investors
already may invest directly in German companies within the German
capital market system, for example. Taxes and an unfamiliarity with
the German capital markets may hinder this mobility; however, reci-
procity simply reduces this transaction cost and thereby increases in-
vestor mobility. Furthermore, to the extent United States regulations
are superior and therefore result in investors willing to pay a higher
price for issues, foreign companies will voluntarily elect to comply
with United States securities laws.
Second, even where issuers and investors have the ability to opt for
different securities regimes, countries may aid mobility through agree-
ments to make this choice clear, credible, and firm. Regulation S, for
example, allows United States investors to opt out of the United
States regime somewhat if their offshore transactions do not consist of
any "directed selling efforts" in the United States and complies with
other requirements.9' What constitutes directed selling efforts, how-
ever, relies on whether activities that might "condition" the United
States market have taken place.' Because the term "condition" is
somewhat vague, investors lack the ability to opt out of the United
90. See Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a
Time of Economic Transformation, 17 Fordham Int'l L.J. S77, S89 (1994).
[I]f the SEC were to adopt a system of home country exemptions, then U.S.
investors would be confronted even today with financial statements pre-
pared under at least forty different sets of accounting principles. That ap-
proach actually has been tried in the past, and the results are chronicled in
the Bible in the story of the Tower of Babel.
Id.
91. See Securities Act Rule 903(b).
92. See Securities Act Rule 902(b)(1).
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States regime with confidence. International agreements, both har-
monizing the choice of law issues facing parties to a securities transac-
tion and allowing such parties to commit to a particular regime's laws
ex ante, will encourage more transactions and increase capital market
mobility. In addition, it is important to recognize that choice of law
agreements, much like international agreements dealing with capital
mobility, face less delay and political opportunism pressure than sub-
stantive international agreements.
Third, agreements that encourage the sharing of information and
the effective enforcement of securities laws should be encouraged. 93
Diversity in securities regimes is desirable because investors can iden-
tify the regimes of the country in which shares are being issued and
can adjust the discount factor accordingly. It is, however, important
that the securities regulations of every country can be enforced effec-
tively against parties that operate internationally. Agreements that
facilitate evidence gathering and the service of process, for example,
should be encouraged. Such agreements involve the least amount of
cooperation between countries, and as a result, are most easily ob-
tained.94 Furthermore, because enforcement agreements do not in-
volve any substantive change in countries' securities regimes, these
agreements are less vulnerable to political capture.95
Fourth, even where investors are free to invest abroad and reciproc-
ity agreements reduce the cost of doing so, mobility may be con-
strained by "natural advantage" factors not directly related to the
securities regulatory regime. For example, even in a world of com-
plete mobility, investors may choose to stay in the United States de-
spite a strong dislike for the United States securities regime because
no other country offers the same liquidity or size of capital markets.
Similarly, the presence of an efficient stock execution, transfer, and
settlement system as well as a strong contract, bankruptcy, and com-
93. Indeed, agreements dealing with securities enforcement and information shar-
ing are the most prevalent of cooperative agreements among countries today. See
Trachtman, supra note 27, at 75.
94. See, e.g., id at 85-86 (stating enforcement assistance "provides the least troub-
lesome ... intrusions on domestic sovereignty").
95. An example of such enforcement agreements are the series of bilateral memo-
randa of understandings that the SEC has negotiated with various foreign govern-
ments. While not formal treaties, the memoranda of understandings serve as mutual
expressions of intent that different country regulators will assist one another with
both information and enforcement cooperation. See id. at 86-87. In particular, memo-
randa of understandings have been used in the area of insider trading enforcement.
See Kehoe, supra note 75, at 359-62.
Other agreements may also be desirable in order to achieve various objectives that
are not the primary goals of the securities regime. For example, if company X has
investors all in country 1 but has some minor activities in country 2 that cause sub-
stantial tort harms, the assets in country 2 may be insufficient to pay damages-and
therefore X may have great incentives ex ante to engage in hazardous activities in
foreign countries. This problem would be a case in which an international tort agree-
ment may be useful.
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mercial legal system will also affect the mobility decision of investors.
Of course, competing jurisdictions will have an incentive to create the
necessary infrastructure to attract investors. Nevertheless, efforts
should be undertaken to encourage a separating equilibrium through
international cooperation aimed at developing legal infrastructures
that will increase the willingness of investors and issuers to become
mobile.
B. Private Mechanisms
As a substitute for substantive international regulatory cooperation,
individual countries may seek to enhance the operation of private de-
vices designed to provide investors with information on securities is-
sues. The main justification for capital market regulation is the
information gap between issuers, insiders, and investors. If no asym-
metry of information exists-or alternatively, no issuer lies about its
own value-then all investors could determine the true value of each
company and pay accordingly. In a well-functioning, efficient market,
the price would incorporate this information, protecting even unso-
phisticated investors. The greatest danger, therefore, lies where infor-
mation is not public or where no well-functioning market exists for the
issuer's securities. With respect to international capital markets, the
additional danger exists that investors will be insufficiently informed
about the legal regime under which they are investing. In these situa-
tions, government regulation provides one means of combating the
asymmetric information problem. Through disclosure, at least theo-
retically, private information becomes public, lessening the asymmet-
ric information problem. Through antifraud rules, issuers, again
theoretically, are given incentives not to take advantage of investors
where an asymmetric information problem does exist. To the extent
government regulation is ineffective or impossible to implement on a
global scale, however, at least two private mechanisms exist to fill the
breach. These involve: (1) certification or reputational in-
termediaries, and (2) investor empowerment.
1. Certification Intermediaries
Where an asymmetric information problem exists between two mar-
ket participants-for example, between the issuer and investor-par-
ties recognizing the asymmetry will adjust market prices accordingly.
For example, take the case of two companies, X and Y, where X is
worth $100 per share and Y is worth $50 per share. In this case, inves-
tors unable to distinguish between X and Y will price both companies
at $75.96 Higher-value companies, as a result, subsidize lower-value
companies; not surprisingly, higher-value companies have an incentive
96. Note that this assumes that the number of shares of both companies X and Y
traded in the market are equivalent.
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to distinguish themselves. To the extent higher-value companies are
unable to do so, however, they incur a higher cost of capital and may
opt to leave the capital market. Furthermore, ex ante, companies con-
templating whether to make investments in quality may choose not to
do so. In other words, companies understanding the problem of asym-
metric information will select investments to remain lower-value
rather than higher-value companies. Therefore, society as a whole
loses as companies forego beneficial investment projects.
The asymmetric information problem is further exacerbated in the
international context. Where countries race-to-the-bottom, legal
mechanisms designed to allow higher-value companies to distinguish
themselves credibly from lower-value companies may weaken. For
example, when countries race to dilute their antifraud protections,
companies no longer may rely on legal sanctions to bind themselves to
truthful disclosures. As a result, investors will view statements from
even higher-value companies with skepticism. Similarly, as
mandatory disclosure rules weaken, higher value companies may find
that investors are less able to compare their value against that of other
companies. 97 Particularly where high-value companies lack mobility,
they will not be able to switch to a jurisdiction with stringent antifraud
or disclosure rules to signal their value to investors.
Certification intermediaries, or gatekeepers, provide lawmakers
with an alternative device to protect investors and to identify higher-
value companies globally.9" Certifiers in the global securities context
include the major securities and investment firms, such as Goldman
Sachs & Co., Morgan Stanley Inc., and CS First Boston, as well as
internationally recognized auditing firms, including Deloitte Touche,
Arthur Anderson, and Coopers & Lybrand. Certifiers act to reduce
the asymmetric information problem between investors and issuers.
Through an association with a certifier, higher-value firms are able to
signal credibly their value to investors. Investors will consider such a
signal to be credible so long as: (1) the certifiers actually possess the
necessary expertise to distinguish among different value issues, and
(2) the certifiers possess adequate incentives to execute faithfully their
certification duties. To the extent that both of these conditions are
97. Of course, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that higher-value companies will
voluntarily disclose information. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 672-75.
Without a standardized mechanism to disclose this information, however, investors
may not be able to interpret correctly the value of the company. Furthermore, where
antifmud regimes are lax, higher-value companies will still face a credibility problem
in conveying their true value.
98. For a general discussion of the role of certification intermediaries, see Stephen
Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, (working paper on file with authors); see also
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J. Law Econ. & Org. 53 (1986) (describing how legal liability may be used
to encourage third-party intermediaries to certify the value of another's products).
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met, certifiers offer the following advantages over public regulatory
mechanisms.
First, certifiers and the signal they provide cross international bor-
ders with greater ease than regulatory devices. Without an interna-
tional agreement, individual countries may employ different securities
regulatory regimes. In contrast, Goldman Sachs, for example, is pres-
ent in dozens of different countries. Goldman Sachs's capital base is
spread across these different countries and its professionals are rela-
tively mobile between the countries. Furthermore, Goldman Sachs's
reputation with investors spans these different countries. The ability
of certifiers to operate across country borders leads to several advan-
tages. Certifiers may develop standardized procedures to evaluate
companies and standardized means of transmitting this information to
investors, thereby reducing costs. Furthermore, investors may rely on
certifiers to provide a known quality of certification. Even where in-
vestors contemplate investing in companies from foreign countries
where the investors have relatively little experience, the investors may
rely on the reputation of the associated international certifier.99
Second, unlike government agencies that may lack experience or
expertise in regulating securities, international certifiers bring with
them great expertise in evaluating investments. Because certifiers are
paid in part for their ability to screen out bad investment prospects,
they have strong financial incentives to develop their expertise. Even
well-intentioned regulators lack the same amount of economic incen-
tive to invest in information technology and financial screening capa-
bilities. Furthermore, because the certifier represents one firm across
several different borders, the transmission of its expertise across dif-
ferent country-branch offices is also easier for the international certi-
fier. The international certifier, as a result, may enjoy economics of
scope and scale over an individual country regulator. The presence of
international certifiers in several countries also provides the certifier
an informational advantage to judge the value of multinational corpo-
rations. Such presence provides the international certifier with de-
tailed information on each country's securities regulatory regime as
well as local knowledge of the operations of multinational
corporations.
Finally, unlike government agencies, international certifiers have a
greater incentive to execute their certification role faithfully. As with
domestic certifiers, international certifiers are paid in part by issuers
based on the certifier's ability to deliver investors willing to pay for
the issuers' securities at a high price. Investors in turn will pay this
price based on the reputation of the certifier to screen for misleading
and low-value issuers. The greater the certifier's future potential re-
99. Of course, where no international certifier is associated with the foreign com-
pany, investors lack this certification information.
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turn from this function, the more incentive the certifier has to remain
faithful. As a result, international certifiers, with capital spread across
several different countries, frequently take on larger issues than do-
mestic securities firms. Greater capital investment and increased
presence in several different countries encourages international certi-
fiers to remain faithful in their function. This is particularly important
because international certifiers certify issuers where investors typically
have much less information than domestic issuers.
Left without any international regulation, therefore, private certifi-
cation agents provide investors in foreign companies with some mea-
sure of protection from fraud and reduce the basic asymmetric
information problem between themselves and foreign issuers. Fur-
thermore, this protection is relatively independent of country-specific
boundaries or regulations.
2. Institutional Investors
The private market may also respond to the problem of asymmetric
information through the aggregation of resources designed to reduce
this asymmetry. Even where investors lack the direct access to issuers
that certifiers enjoy, often-with enough resources-other informa-
tion is available to approximate the true value of an issue. Take for
example Netscape, Inc. Information on the general volume of com-
puter sales, the growth rate of the internet, and the nature of
Microsoft's competing web browser all could have been gathered and
synthesized to assess Netscape's potential. The greatest barrier for
most investors to engage in such activity, however, is the cost. Most
investors have too little at stake to make such an investigation worth-
while; furthermore, most investors lack the expertise to synthesize this
information.
In the domestic context, mutual funds represent one response to the
problem of asymmetric information. Investors in a mutual fund essen-
tially purchase not only the right to the underlying securities of the
fund but also the expertise of the fund manager in selecting these se-
curities. The rise in the importance of mutual funds and other institu-
tional investors has two implications for domestic securities markets.
First, small investors not a part of such funds may experience even
more of an asymmetric information problem in the context of new
issues. Second, in secondary market trading, securities prices should
reflect the information obtained through the efforts of fund managers
and, therefore, be more efficient.
Internationally, the growth in importance of institutional investors
may also lessen the problem of asymmetric information and thereby
reduce the need for international regulatory cooperation. Unlike
small investors, institutional investors possess the resources and incen-
tives to conduct detailed investigations of the companies in which they
invest across international boundaries. Indeed, as companies become
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more multinational, only investors with the capability of gathering in-
formation from several different countries will be able to accurately
gauge a company's true worth. Furthermore, to the extent that learn-
ing about the securities regulatory regime of different countries is
costly, institutional investors again possess an advantage over small
investors. The large securities volume institutional investors transact
makes investigating the securities regulatory regime of several differ-
ent countries cost-effective. Therefore, institutional investors are
more likely than smaller investors to discount securities accurately
from countries with relatively lax securities regimes.
As with the domestic expansion of institutional investors, global ex-
pansion has two impacts on small investors. First, small investors will
suffer an even greater asymmetric information problem vis-a-vis insti-
tutional investors. This is particularly true with respect to foreign
country investment where small investors typically lack knowledge
both on the business operations of the issuer and the local regulatory
regime. Because institutional investors will be more successful in try-
ing to purchase securities from higher-value companies, small inves-
tors suffer a winner's curse, purchasing disproportionately large
quantities of lower-value companies. 100 Second, in secondary mar-
kets, the presence of institutional investors will increase the efficiency
of such markets ultimately protecting small investors.
Institutional investors, therefore, provide a private mechanism to
further goals similar to those pursued by proponents of international
securities regulation. Furthermore, individual countries may play a
role in either hindering or supporting such institutional investors.
Countries, for example, may support the presence of institutional in-
vestors in a number of different ways. First, countries may actively
subsidize the growth of such investors. In the United States, for ex-
ample, one of the largest sources of growth for institutional investors
has been through the expansion of company-sponsored 401(k)
plans. 10 ' Employee contributions out of their income into a 401(k)
plan are not taxed until eventually withdrawn; furthermore, invest-
ment income within the 401(k) plan is not taxed until withdrawn from
the plan. Employees therefore enjoy the double benefit of deferred
taxation and tax-free investment build-up throughout the life of the
401(k) plan.
Second, countries should consider removing restrictions on the in-
vestment activities of institutional investors.' ° In the United States,
100. See, e.g., Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. Fim. Econ. 187
(1986) (providing a model of initial public offering discounting based on an asymme-
try of information between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors).
101. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1997).
102. See generally Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund
Industry, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469 (1991) (describing the effects of regulation on the
mutual fund industry).
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for example, both the Investment Company Act of 1940103 and the
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") place restrictions on the ability of
mutual funds to invest. In particular, both the Investment Company
Act and the Internal Revenue Code penalize non-diversified funds."°
The IRC, for example, only allows funds that meet its diversified crite-
ria to pass through taxes to individual investors. Non-diversified
funds must pay another layer of tax in between the tax at the corpo-
rate issuer's level and individual income tax at the investor level-
resulting in triple taxation for such funds.'0 5 The diversification re-
quirement forces funds to avoid holding greater than ten percent of
the voting stock of any one company, even if the company would rep-
resent only a marginal portion of the fund's total size. This, in turn,
reduces the incentive for funds to investigate companies for underval-
ued "deals." Again, such a rule has the greatest impact on interna-
tional investments in smaller markets where greater asymmetries of
information exist. Because funds may, at most, purchase only ten per-
cent of an undervalued company's stock, funds ex ante will have less of
an incentive to conduct detailed financial research of such underval-
ued companies.10 6
Third, countries may wish to eliminate any subsidies they provide
for small investors to purchase stocks individually. The United States,
for example, makes it a priority to ensure smaller investors have the
ability to compete with higher volume investors in obtaining quote
information and to place orders. The NASDAQ short order execution
system is an example of this.107 Such subsidies, however, cause more
investors to eschew funds and to invest individually, leading to a
greater need for regulatory protection of such investors. Particularly
where such investors would otherwise join a fund rather than invest
individually, governments should consider removing this distortion
and deterrence to the growth of funds.
Finally, countries may seek to remove any impediments from funds
investing overseas. To the extent investing overseas results in large
transaction costs (i.e., taxes from the foreign country), countries may
seek to reduce such costs through reciprocal agreements with other
countries or through the use of depository receipts in their own trad-
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1994).
104. See Roe, supra note 102, at 1474-80 (detailing the prohibitions and penalties
within the Investment Company Act and the Internal Revenue Code against nondi-
versified funds).
105. See id.
106. Indian regulators currently are considering reforms to encourage the growth
of their mutual fund industry. Among other areas, the reforms may target Indian
regulations governing the ability of funds to concentrate investments in one industry
or one company. See Sumit Sharma, India Mulls Steps to Polish Image of Mutual
Funds, Asian Wall St. J., June 27, 1996, at 1.
107. See Richard G. Ketchum & Beth E. Weimer, Market 2000 and the NASDAQ
Stock Market, 19 J. Corp. L. 559, 577-78 (1994) (describing recent NASD changes to
the NASDAQ short order execution system to curb misuse of the system).
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ing markets. Countries may also allow indexes of other countries'
stocks or derivative instruments based on other countries' stocks to
trade domestically to allow institutional investors either to sell short
some stock or hedge their positions in foreign countries easily. This is
particularly important if other countries do not allow short selling or
derivative transactions within their borders. For example, consider an
institutional investor that wishes to take a position that a particular
foreign equity security will rise by ten dollars per share but no more
than twenty dollars per share. If the foreign country where the secur-
ity trades does not allow derivative transactions, the institutional in-
vestor will be unable to take its desired position. To the extent the
institutional investor's own domestic country allows such derivative
transactions, however, the investor may then purchase the foreign eq-
uity abroad and sell a call option domestically on the security with an
exercise price of twenty dollars more than the current price of the
security to achieve its desired risk-return profile.'08
CONCLUSION
As world markets have expanded in scope, the importance of inter-
national pressures on domestic securities regulatory regimes has
grown. With more reliable and speedier communication devices, both
issuers and investors now find it relatively simple to participate in se-
curities transactions in foreign jurisdictions. Furthermore, the grow-
ing stability and familiarity of a number of different markets-from
Hong Kong to Switzerland-as well as the growth in trustworthy pay-
ment and transfer systems has encouraged many domestic parties to
conduct their investment activities abroad. This global expansion has
provided securities market participants with greater liquidity and
more diversification of risk, to the net social gain of all.
Countries, nevertheless, continue to control securities transactions
that take place under their specific jurisdiction. Although the world
markets may have globalized, the legal and political regimes upon
which the world markets rest are highly country-specific. Analysis of
securities markets under an assumption of homogeneous participants
108. See Note, Investor Liability: Financial Innovations in the Regulatory State and
the Coming Revolution in Corporate Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1941 (1994) (discussing
the use of financial derivative securities in international transactions).
Despite the advantages of institutional investors in promoting an optimal global
regulatory regime, governments, nevertheless, should remain wary of too much con-
centration of investment power within the hands of a few institutional investors. Prin-
cipal-agent problems may exist between the fund trustees and the investors into the
fund. Trustees, for example, may short sell stocks within their funds and then dump
the stocks in an attempt to reduce the stock price at a gain for themselves. Further-
more, funds themselves may become privy to insider information and engage in in-
sider trading. Finally, although large concentrations of stock ownership may
ameliorate corporate governance problems between management and ownership, ex-
tensive fund ownership may actually lead to more collusion between companies with
cross-linking ownership patterns.
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leads to the conclusion that countries may face either a race-to-the-
top or race-to-the-bottom in designing their respective securities regu-
latory regimes. Where a range of investors, issuers, and countries ex-
ist, however, greater capital mobility in general increases the
likelihood that a separating equilibrium of diverse sets of regulatory
regimes will arise and that global welfare will be increased as a result.
In adopting its own national regulatory regime, the United States
has chosen to apply its laws extraterritorially. The antifraud rules dis-
cussed in this Article are one example of this approach. This Article
has attempted to demonstrate that more effective reform may be pos-
sible by modifying the conditions under which countries compete for
securities transactional volume. Several complimentary strategies
have been identified. First and foremost, countries should encourage,
rather than discourage international capital mobility. The greater the
mobility of capital, the more advantageous countries will find it to es-
tablish regimes that appeal to a certain "type" of security, and there-
fore, the greater the impetus will be towards a diverse set of regimes.
Second, this Article supports efforts to find cooperative approaches
to the regulation of international securities but points out that it is
important to pursue beneficial forms of cooperation and avoid harm-
ful ones. Agreements that focus on information sharing, enforcement
issues, and capital mobility should be encouraged-these all lead to a
more efficient functioning of capital markets and regulatory regimes.
Attempts to achieve a common substantive law with respect to securi-
ties, however, is counterproductive and should be discouraged. A
convergence in the securities laws of many countries undermines the
natural incentive to establish a range of regulatory systems.
Third, the extraterritorial reach of the securities laws should be se-
verely curtailed. By adopting a territorial approach, with an exception
for cases in which behavior abroad truly impacts the domestic market,
countries will clarify the choice of law question, reduce the frequency
and cost of overlapping jurisdictions, and increase the mobility of cap-
ital by allowing investors and issuers to choose their regime without
fear that their domestic regime will follow them. Such capital mobil-
ity, in turn, increases the likelihood of a beneficial separating equilib-
rium among regulatory regimes.
Finally, the growth of private mechanisms that help investors judge
the value of securities offers a low cost and efficient way to encourage
capital mobility and reduce informational asymmetries. In particular,
both certification intermediaries and the rise of mutual fund financial
investment intermediaries provide promise of greater market-based
means for investors to reduce the information asymmetry inherent in
securities transactions.
If the international securities market is to function more efficiently,
it must be governed in an efficient and sensible manner. Regulating
international activity with national laws is one of the great challenges
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of modem international law. This Article has attempted to demon-
strate that it is possible to regulate international securities markets
despite the fact that we lack the ability to legislate internationally. By
encouraging capital mobility and by allowing the market to harness
the information that is revealed by an issuer's choice of regime, the
challenge of national legislation can lead to an efficient result even
though we lack the luxury of a truly international securities regulatory
regime.
